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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the hypothetical: the U.S. Border Patrol is recalled from the
border to deal with a major infectious breakout at various detention facilities
throughout the United States. Although it remains the stated “Will of
Congress” that the federal government exert complete occupation of the
Border Security field, the border of state X is left essentially unguarded by
direction of the Executive Branch, in direct opposition to that Will.
Opportunistic terrorist infiltration through a porous border has become
predictable through intelligence assessment. Governor Smith asks her
Attorney General what rights and responsibilities she has to remedy the
security “Void.” The Attorney General tells her clearly that it is the
preeminent function of the government to provide security for the citizens of
her state. Equally clear, the Attorney General tells Governor Smith that she
has absolutely no authority under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution to take any border security action, whatsoever. What options are
available to Governor Smith, and which shall she choose?
It is, however, no longer an academic hypothetical. “In August, the
Texas Department of Public Safety put out a bulletin that said ISIS social
media messages showed ‘militants are expressing an increased interest in the
notion that they could clandestinely infiltrate the southwest border of US, for
terror attack.’”1
In his forceful dissent in Arizona v. United States, Associate Justice
1
Immigration Worker Union Warns ‘Serious Threat’ of ISIS Entering US, FOX NEWS (Sept. 18,
2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/09/18/immigration-worker-union-warns-serious-threat-isis
-entering-us/.
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of the United States Supreme Court, Antonin Scalia, wrote of an impending
constitutional crisis imposed on the states through an inactive federal
government.2 “What I do fear--and what Arizona and the States that support
it fear--is that ‘federal policies’ of nonenforcement Will leave the States
helpless before those evil effects of illegal immigration that the Court’s
opinion dutifully recites in its prologue but leaves unremedied in its
disposition.”3 Justice Scalia’s dissent focuses our constitutional attention
sharply on the field of immigration and border security, fully occupied by the
federal government through the Will of Congress.4 Inherent in that full
occupation of the field is the implied preemption of state law by a massive
body of federal law.5 “First, States are precluded from regulating conduct in
a field that Congress has determined must be regulated by its exclusive
governance.”6 Justice Scalia continues: “I accept as a given that State
regulation is excluded by the Constitution when (1) it has been prohibited by
a valid federal law, or (2) it conflicts with federal regulation--when, for
example, it admits those whom federal regulation would exclude, or excludes
those whom federal regulation would admit.”7 Yet in this case, in spite of
massive federal law and an expressed Will of Congress that the federal
government exert full authority in immigration and border security, the
branch charged with execution of the law failed to substantially execute, by
choice.
States and municipalities rely on federal enforcement for immigration
and border security.8 State budgets, law enforcement manpower and security
resources are sized and maintained on assumptions.9 It is a principal
assumption that through total federal enforcement action, those scarce state
resources and finances can be directed elsewhere.10 The presumption is that
border security and attendant law enforcement are the sole responsibilities of
the federal government.11 It should be redundant to suggest and expect that
federal resources will therefore provide border security and enforcement on
behalf of the state. But if the federal government fails by policy design to
provide those presumed security and enforcement services, a state is left
without programmed resources, or more critically, the constitutional latitude
to provide its own security.12 A state government, prevented from enacting
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2514 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2519 (internal citation omitted).
4
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941).
5
Id. at 66.
6
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2495; see also Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 115
(1992) (Souter, J., dissenting).
7
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2514 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
8
Id. at 2500 (majority opinion).
9
See SUSAN COMBS, TEX. COMPTROLLER PUB. ACCOUNTS, WINDOW ON STATE GOVERNMENT,
https://wayback.archive-it.org/414/20080822082442/http://www.window.state.tx.us/border/ch12/ch
12.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
10
Id.
11
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2500.
12
See COMBS, supra note 9.
2
3
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and enforcing law in a fully occupied field, is left with no alternative legal
recourse to enforce law or provide fundamental protection of its citizens.13
The federal government exerts the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution to establish exclusive federal space in such varied areas,
including immigration, border security, environmental regulation, and federal
airspace. In doing so, the normal presumption of government at all levels is
that by exerting that implied preemption, the federal government then acts to
enforce federal responsibilities, standards, and security activities in
accordance with law, regulation, and the expressed or implied Will of
Congress.
But, what if the federal government actively invokes supremacy in
the field, but fails to act substantively in the field for any one of a variety of
potential reasons? The constitutional tug noted by Justice Scalia results.14
This is similar to null preemption, but with a twist.15 There are significant
federal laws in federal space, but they are intentionally not enforced. Indeed,
traditionally, the conflict is framed between federal and state occupation in a
field.16 However, the conflict has morphed in the 21st Century into a threeway battle between states’ rights and obligations, the Will of Congress, and
the discretion of the Executive. This has become a powerful struggle, with
momentous consequences. And yet, “[l]ittle attention is paid in the academic
literature to the propriety of this federal preemption by inaction.”17
What are the obligations and rights of the states? Again, Justice
Scalia foreshadows the immense conflict inherent in that question: “‘[F]ield
preemption’ cannot establish a prohibition of additional state penalties in the
area of immigration.”18 We can express this concept in a more generalized
manner. Therefore, the absence of substantial federal action in executing U.S.
law in a field deemed exclusive to the federal government voids the
corresponding field preemption and enables individual state enforcement
actions.
This Comment will begin by examining recent, topical incidents of
state government stymied by field preemption, yet struggling with issues that
remain unresolved due to federal inaction in the fields currently. In a federal
system that embodies dual citizenship, individual states have express needs
and responsibilities to their citizens under state law, as well as responsibilities
and restrictions under the Constitution. This establishes the baseline for
struggle when the federal government fails to act in a predictable manner.
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2514 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2519.
15
Jonathan Remy Nash, Null Preemption, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015, 1019 (2010).
16
Id. at 1042.
17
Robert L. Glicksman, Nothing is Real: Protecting the Regulatory Void Through Federal
Preemption by Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 5, 8 (2008).
18
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2519.
13
14
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The consequential needs of the states and the implication of a failure of federal
government to meet those expressed needs in traditionally occupied federal
space create conflict and constitutional uncertainly. This analysis will review
the concept of null preemption put forward by Professor Jonathan Remy
Nash, and embrace an emergent concept applicable to field occupied areas of
law.19 The result of unchecked discretion of the “federal Executive,” and the
implication of inaction by the federal Executive will be examined, in the
context of the equivalent of an unchecked veto of legislation after enactment.
This also necessitates an examination of the policy and political pressures
inherent in that “Executive Discretion.” This conflict then demands a
constitutionally-relevant resolution path that will result in the satisfaction of
the three principle actors: the state, Congress, and the federal Executive.
II. BACKGROUND
A. State Conflicts within Preemptive Federal Space
State conflicts within preemptive federal space are on the rise,
manifested by the absence of federal action. In many ways, the preemption
conflict between state and federal governments is omnipresent in today’s
dynamic political environment.20
As Professor [Garrick] Pursley explains, “[p]reemption . . .
shapes the regulatory environment for most major industries-drugs and medical devices, tobacco, banking, air
transportation, securities, cars, and boats[,] to name a few,”
and it “determines the diversity, scope, and delivery of a wide
variety of important government services to citizens”; as a
result, “it is the issue of constitutional law that most directly
impacts everyday life.”21
The impact of non-enforcement of federal law in preemptive fields potentially
cuts across a significant swath of state police powers. “As Garrick Pursley
has observed, ‘preemption may be the most important issue for modern
federalism theory because it reallocates regulatory authority between the
national and state governments.’”22 States have sought action of the federal
government, and the impact of non-enforcement is most keenly felt by a few
states.23 These states have attempted remedial action to better enforce a safer

19
See Nash, supra note 15, at 1015 (describing his theory of Null Preemption, as a comparison to field
preemption and the absence of federal action).
20
See Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in
the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 261–84 (2011).
21
Id. at 255.
22
Id. at 254–55.
23
See, e.g., Alicia Lee & William Dong, Arizona v. United States (11-182), CORNELL U. L. SCH.:
LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/11-182 (last visited Apr. 20, 2016) (describing
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or more protective environment for its citizens in the absence of federal
enforcement of laws.24 “Some of the most important federalism choices that
Congress and executive actors make have to do not so much with the scope
of federal regulation, but rather with the extent to which that regulation will
displace state law.”25
In response to state action to protect or defend its populace in these
fields, the federal government has exerted its preemption, either
administratively or through the courts, resulting in a stymied enforcement
process.26 In particular, the area of immigration control not only exemplifies
important aspects of the current “preemption yet inaction” debate, but it also
serves as a catalyst for the resulting border security preemption conflict.
1. Immigration enforcement by the states is limited.
Immigration enforcement by the states is limited by clear federal
preemptive status. Insufficient federal action in a preempted area of
immigration serves not only as an example of preemption yet inaction, but as
a forcing function to stimulate the border security preemption yet inaction
case. Unenforced immigration issues have become significant state
burdens.27 “The state of Arizona maintains that it faced rampant illegal
immigration, which increased crime and harmed Arizona’s economy.”28 The
causation of the immigration issue in Arizona was potentially traced to earlier
federal legislative action.29 “The defects in IRCA [(“Immigration Reform
Control Act”)], combined with unprecedented growth and job creation by the
US economy in the 1990s and early 2000s, as well as deeply ingrained
migration push factors in Mexico and, more recently, Central America,
enabled illegal immigration to continue to grow.”30 Clearly, the state of
Arizona had an interest in immigration directly into the Arizona economy.
In response to this concern, in April 2010, the Arizona State
Legislature enacted the Support Our Law Enforcement and
Safe Neighborhoods Act (“S.B. 1070”), which establishes or
amends state immigration offenses and defines local police
officers’ immigration law enforcement authority. Section 1
of S.B. 1070 states that the Arizona legislature’s goal in
the State of Arizona’s position on attempting to control its perception of increasing immigration, and its
impact).
24
Jordan Jodré, Preemptive Strike: The Battle for Control Over Immigration Policy, 25 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 551, 553 (2011).
25
Young, supra note 20, at 255.
26
See, e.g., Lee & Dong, supra note 23 (explaining the United States’ arguments in support of
preemptive doctrine applied to Arizona S.B. 1070).
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
See DORIS MEISSNER ET AL., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: THE RISE OF A
FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 1 (2013).
30
Id.
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enacting this statute was to deter illegal immigrants from
entering the country and from engaging in economic
activity.31
A catalyst for the drafting of the legislation was the concern among
Arizona political leadership that they needed to act in response to an
insufficiently active federal enforcement operation.32 “During this time, there
[was] strong and sustained bipartisan support for strengthened immigration
enforcement, along with deep skepticism over the federal government’s will
or ability to effectively enforce the nation’s immigration laws.”33 The federal
government argued that in spite of its limited enforcement action, Arizona
was precluded from enforcing immigration laws within the federallyoccupied immigration sphere.34 Therefore, Arizona’s government and
resources became subject to the discretionary federal enforcement policies at
that time.35
Coincidentally, states were struggling to make up the perceived
federal enforcement deficit.36
The perpetual inaction of the federal government has led
numerous state governments to enact legislation intended to
supplement or enhance current federal immigration law.
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures,
there were a record number of 222 immigration laws enacted
and 131 resolutions adopted in forty-eight states in 2009.37
Yet the ultimate constitutionality of these legislative initiatives will bear on
the precedential application of Arizona v. United States to other states’ efforts.
2. Border security represents a key nexus between federal interests,
constitutional authority, and local state interests in protection of its citizenry.
In another example of the clear expectation conflict between state and
federal authorities, border security pits state interests against federal
enforcement policies. The issue is closely related to the federal-state
preemptive relationship in the immigration field, but distinct in key areas.
Border security in the context of this Comment is not focused on immigration
and the lawful or unlawful access to U.S. citizenship or residency rights, but
on the defense and protection of the population of the United States against
Lee & Dong, supra note 23 (internal citations omitted).
See MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 29, at 1.
Id.
34
See Brief for the United States at 26, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182)
(describing the position of the United States that Arizona S.B. 1070 intrudes on exclusive federal
authority).
35
Id. at 17.
36
Jodré, supra note 24, at 553.
37
Id.
31
32
33
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harm, whether through illegal cross-border, violent activity, military action
by a foreign actor, or non-state terrorist activity. While the defense
mechanisms at the borders may be one in the same, the character is different.
It is the intent of this analysis to focus on this border security mandate of
government.
Border security has become a critical topic in southwestern states of
the United States. The National Conference of State Legislatures (“NCSL”)
“urge[d] the federal government to fulfill its responsibilities with regard to
border security . . . .”38 Indeed, Texas has quantified the border security issue
directly to the federal government.
Drug cartels and related forces are waging war in Northern
Mexico, their tactics including death threats, torture, car
bombings, kidnappings, assassinations and beheadings.
Since 2006, this war has taken 28,000 lives. Absent stronger
federal action, it’s only a matter of time before that violence
affects more innocent Americans.39
In this case, border security may be the implied and the sole responsibility of
the federal government, but the impact is felt keenly in the immediate border
states most critically. The states have a requirement to defend territorial
borders. But these border states are put in a precarious position when the
federal security capability is available but not employed, yet is the sole legal
actor authorized to defend that border.
B. Security of a state and its borders is the preeminent issue and represents
the baseline case for this pre-emption analysis.
The 2010 National Security Strategy of the United States addresses
security within the United States and the need to address and protect the U.S.
borders implicitly:40
Our best defenses against this threat [violent extremist
penetration] are well informed and equipped families, local
communities, and institutions. The Federal Government will
invest in intelligence to understand this threat and expand
community engagement and development programs to
empower local communities. And the Federal Government,
drawing on the expertise and resources from all relevant
agencies, will clearly communicate our policies and
38
Policies for the Jurisdiction of the Law, Criminal Justice and Public Safety Committee, NAT’L
CONF. STATE LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncsl.org/ncsl-in-dc/task-forces/policies-law-and-criminal-justice.
aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
39
Letter from Rick Perry, Governor, to Barack Obama, President (Aug. 9, 2010), http://governor.state.
tx.us/files/press-office/080910_PerryObamaletter.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Governor Perry].
40
See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 19 (2010), http://www.whit
ehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.

Published by eCommons, 2016

166

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1

intentions, listening to local concerns, tailoring policies to
address regional concerns, and making clear that our
diversity is part of our strength—not a source of division or
insecurity.41
However, the missing element in this statement of defensive strategy of the
homeland is an explicit acknowledgement of state authority and its role in the
strategic federal security scheme.42 The statement is clear in federal
intelligence, policy, and awareness of concerns of the local citizens. The
statement does not specify or even allude to a collateral role of the state’s
defense of borders, supported by the federal government.
1. The impact of Arizona v. United States on the border security debate is
critical.
The residual debate and impact of Arizona v. United States
overshadows this discussion and provides a tenable linkage of federal border
security responsibility to the parallel responsibility of each state.43 In his
dissent, Justice Scalia writes:
[T]he Constitution . . . provides that “[n]o State shall, without
the Consent of Congress, . . . engage in War, unless actually
invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of
delay.” This limits the States’ sovereignty . . . but leaves
intact their inherent power to protect their territory.44
The issue is timely in 2014. The introductory hypothetical has become more
of a real planning exercise than a hypothetical. “The Pentagon’s top
commander in South America [Marine General John Kelly, Chief of the U.S.
Southern Command] has warned that if Ebola surfaces in Central America or
the Caribbean, there will be a stampede of people heading north across the
Rio Grande to the U.S. to escape the disease.”45 General Kelly further states,
“[t]hey will run away from Ebola, or if they suspect they are infected, they
will try to get to the United States for treatment.”46 The border will be tested,
and responsibility for border security rests with the federal government. The
states appear to be powerless to provide independent border security, even if
capable, in deference to federal field preemption in border security. Yet, the
attempt to provide state border security otherwise preempted is ongoing in
Texas.

Id.
Id.
43
See generally 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
44
Id. at 2512 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal citation omitted).
45
Mark Thompson, General: Expect ‘Mass Migration’ to U.S. if Ebola Comes to Central America,
TIME (Oct. 9, 2014), http://time.com/3486009/marine-general-john-kelly-ebola-migration/.
46
Id.
41
42
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2. Border security issues in Texas are the most recent reflection of the
tension between the federal Executive and the states.
A crucial frontline in the U.S. border security issue remains the Texas
experience.47 According to the Texas Department of Public Safety:
The most significant public safety and homeland security
vulnerability in Texas is an unsecured border with Mexico,
which has enabled the Mexican Cartels to become multibillion dollar international crime syndicates that dominate the
U.S. drug and human smuggling and trafficking markets.
They employ terrorist tactics and corruption to expand or
defend their criminal enterprise activities, and they work
closely with transnational and Texas-based gangs to further
their criminal operations throughout Texas and the nation.48
The issue of security on the Texas border is typically put into terms that
implicate federal inaction in the field. “Perry says Texas had to act because
the federal government has failed to secure the border.”49 In doing so, the
Texas state government has allocated millions of dollars and committed
National Guard troops, under state control, to attempt to assist federal efforts
to meet security needs and deny cartels and criminals easy access into Texas.50
Texas Governor Rick Perry, in 2014, deployed 1,000 troops under his state
authority.51
At the state and local level, the Texas imperative to make up for the
perceived federal border presence is most keenly felt. “Border security is a
federal responsibility but a Texas problem, and Texas has invested hundreds
of millions of state dollars in efforts to support and supplement security forces
already in place. Still, this is a problem that will only be solved with more
federal accountability and involvement.”52 Texas, however, continues to
increase its military-like presence on the border, in lieu of federal law
enforcement. For example, “[i]n September 2009, Gov. Perry announced the
formation of highly-skilled Ranger Recon Teams — which include Texas
Rangers, Texas National Guard Counterdrug forces, Highway Patrol and DPS
Aviation assets — in order to address threats building in the unincorporated
47
TEX. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, TEXAS BORDER SECURITY DASHBOARD (2015), https://www.txdps.st
ate.tx.us/PublicInformation/documents/borderSecDshbrd20150409.pdf
48
Id.
49
Manuel Bojorquez, As Texas Steps Up Border Security, Critics Decry “Militarization”, CBS NEWS
(Aug. 13, 2014, 7:24 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/as-texas-steps-up-border-security-critics-decry
-militarization/.
50
Manny Fernandez, Texas Bolsters Border Patrol With Its Own, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2014), http://w
ww.nytimes.com/2014/08/07/us/texas-is-accused-of-overreaching-and-overspending-to-policeborder.html?_r=0.
51
Id.
52
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, RICK PERRY, BORDER SECURITY, https://wayback.archive-it.org/414/2
0141117014906/http://governor.state.tx.us/initiatives/border/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
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areas along the Texas-Mexico border.”53 Clearly the efforts of Texas in
bolstering border security appear to some legal scholars as significantly
conflicting with the federal mandate to fully occupy the field.54
3. Needs of the States: Setting up Conflict with Federal Priorities
Federal priorities are focused on key questions that impact the United
States as a sovereign nation, including national defense and some suitable
control of immigration. States’ priorities are focused in this area on two
principle attributes: (i) enforcement resources, and (ii) fiscal predictability.
a. Enforcement Resources
Again, Texas provides an illustrative example of a resourceconflicted approach to security, in conflict with federal action, or inaction.
Despite Texas Governor Perry’s requests for federal action to secure the state
border, there has been no federal answer. “Since early 2009, Gov. Perry has
repeatedly called on Washington to authorize the deployment of 1,000 Title
32 National Guard soldiers to the Texas-Mexico border to support border
security operations currently underway.”55
b. Fiscal Predictability
The ability to plan and resource scarce dollars to allocate to border
security is important to any government. In referring to the fractured nature
of border security in Texas, the situation:
reflects the inability of local leaders to independently call
forth the resources to deal with issues, because funding either
does not exist, or must first be approved by agencies whose
responsibilities extend far beyond the Border region. If the
Border region is to deal successfully with the crucial
problems of the 21st century, this situation must change.56
Indeed, the budgetary realities that dictate a state makeup for federal inaction
cause significant fiscal impact.
In a fiscally conservative state, whose leaders espouse a lowtax, low-spend mantra, the $500 million spent on border

Id.
See generally Rebecca Leber, Texas Attorney General Describes Border Security as Keeping Out
‘Third World Country Practices’, THINKPROGRESS (Feb. 6, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/im
migration/2014/02/06/3250651/abbott-immigration/ (quoting Margaret Hu, Professor at Washington and
Lee School of Law who stated: “[I]f the Texas border security plan is seen as interfering with the federal
government’s foreign policy and national security policy, and other sovereignty interests, it could also be
construed as unconstitutional”).
55
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, supra note 52.
56
COMBS, supra note 9.
53
54
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security has become an exception to the rule.
“It’s a very bittersweet situation,” said State Representative
Dennis Bonnen, the Republican chairman of a House
committee studying the fiscal impact of border operations.
“It’s a clear federal responsibility, but they choose to not do
the job, so we have no choice but to fill the holes.”57
The issue of federal inaction impacting states who must make up the
difference is not isolated to Texas. The National Emergency Management
Association (“NEMA”) has noted the fiscal and budgetary mismatch.58 A
priority in the time of comingled responsibilities is to “[e]nsure state and local
governments and the private sector are provided the resources needed to
address immigration and border security related issues pending federal
resolution of a broader national immigration and border security policy.”59
Clearly, a mutually supportive environment of border security roles
and responsibilities is advantageous:
In unity there is strength. The more local, state, and federal
law-enforcement agencies and operations reinforce one
another, the more they share information and resources, the
more they “deconflict” operations, establish priorities, and
focus energies across the spectrum of criminal activities, the
more effective will be the outcome of separate activities.60
The issue remains whether the states traditional expectations of federal
sovereignty action in border security can be exerted upon the federal
government in this field. And if not, who has residual responsibility for
preempted border security duties that the federal government fails to meet?
There is a clear conflict between the federal government’s obligation
to enforce the laws and provide border security, the needs of the states, and
the reality of an absence of federal action to fill the obligation in a field where
no one else can act constitutionally.
III. ANALYSIS
In consideration of this background, the federal government has
compelling constitutional direction to fulfill its obligations, especially in field
preemptive space, where it is the only legal actor. Using the border security
Fernandez, supra note 50.
See NAT’L HOMELAND SEC. CONSORTIUM, PROTECTING AMERICANS IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
IMPERATIVES FOR THE HOMELAND 6–7 (2014), https://www.iafc.org/files/grHomeSec_ProtectingAmerica
nsInThe21stCentury.pdf.
59
Id. at 7.
60
OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 1999 NATIONAL
DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, at IV.5 (1999), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/publications/policy/99ndcs/
iv-e.html.
57
58
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issue as the baseline for the analysis of preemption and the presumption of
federal action, the framework in pre-emption can no longer be expressed as a
simple tug of war between the federal and state governments.61 The
constitutional discussion has become more complex, with multiple competing
actors in modern case law.62
A. The paradigm63 for preemption analysis has shifted from two actors to
three actors.
This conflict is not traditional . . .
1. The conflict has been typically expressed as a two-actor tug: Federal v.
State.
This is the traditional paradigm of preemption.64 It assumes that the
federal government is acting as a single entity, derived from the Will of
Congress to express the law and the power of the Executive to enforce that
law.65 “[T]he States’ historic police powers cannot be superseded by a
Federal Act unless that is Congress’ clear and manifest purpose, and that any
understanding of a pre-emption statute’s scope rests primarily on ‘a fair
understanding of congressional purpose . . . .”66 This tug is further expressed
in clear language in the Supreme Court’s landmark analysis in Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc.: “Thus, since our decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, . .
. it has been settled that state law that conflicts with federal law is ‘without
effect.’”67 Thus, in prior analyses, the ever-present Will of Congress, as
expressed also in terms of congressional “purpose” or “objective,” represents
the entirety of the federal side in the preemption tug of war, as is clearly
observable in both the majority opinion and the dissents in Arizona v. United
States.68 In the 21st century, the federal side of the preemption equation has
bifurcated, changing character, as the conflict potentially manifests between
not only state and federal, but between federal congressional and federal
Executive, leading to the three-actor struggle.69
2. This paradigm forms the three-actor conflict: State versus Congress
61
See generally Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (depicting an example of the
traditional analysis of federal versus state preemptive rights).
62
See generally Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (discussing preemption and the
relationship between the federal and state governments).
63
See supra text accompanying note 1 (describing how the analytical framework has been traditionally
characterized with two actors, and in the revised model contains three actors).
64
See supra text accompanying note 1.
65
See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 471 (1996) (expressing the role of the Congressional
purpose in determining preemption).
66
Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530 n.27).
67
505 U.S. at 516 (internal citation omitted) (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
68
See generally 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (explaining the significance of Congressional purpose).
69
See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, supra note 52 (explaining that the conflict arises in the Texas
border security case study due to substantive federal Executive inaction).
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versus Executive.
In this construct, three principle actors take potentially adversarial
positions in constitutional conflict, each with a distinct role in preemption
analysis. They are the State, the Congress, and the federal Executive. The
first actor is the state.
a. The State
The state is traditionally modeled as the principle constitutional
antagonist.70 In the construct of this Comment, the state’s position is
characterized by self-interest, colored through its strategy, legislation and
actions in meeting a critically-perceived need. In the instant case, this
Comment shall assume that security of the state, specifically against border
threats, is the first and principle role of government. The specific case
application requires two further assumptions for the purposes of this study.
First, the principle border security focus is on the international border, and in
this case, that border is between the United States and Mexico, in the Texas
border segment. Any intrastate borders, such as Texas and New Mexico, are
not applicable in this constitutional debate. The second additional assumption
is that the state acts as a single political entity. While any state consists of a
government structure parallel to the federal structure, the state acts as a single
political entity in the preemption paradigm. For analytical purposes, in this
case, the state of Texas’s actions and needs are represented through the
actions of the governor. The relationship of the state to the federal
government is characterized through its governor’s actions on behalf of a
unified state interest.71
b. The Congress, as expressed in Legislation and Case Law as the
Will of Congress
The second actor in the three-way analysis is the Congress. The
congressional position is demonstrated through legislative action and
portrayed by the courts as the Will, objective or purpose of Congress.72 In the
context of this preemption, these three terms are treated as consistent and
interchangeable.
This is the baseline of preemption impact and
constitutionality, specifically in field preemption analyses.73 For example,
[i]n all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which
Congress has ‘legislated . . . in a field which the States have
traditionally occupied,’ . . . [the Court] ‘start[s] with the
See supra text accompanying note 1.
See, e.g., Letter from Governor Perry, supra note 39 (demonstrating Texas Governor Perry’s call
for federal action in Title 32 National Guard activation to assist in securing the border, and portraying this
as a “Texas” request to the federal government).
72
See supra text accompanying note 1.
73
See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009).
70
71
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assumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’74
c. The Executive Agent
The traditional two-way preemption conflict, as expressed in Wyeth,
now requires the addition of a third actor, the federal Executive. This is
defined for the purposes of this Comment as the executive branch,
encompassing the President of the United States, or a federal Executive
agency acting at the direction of the President. Within the expanded paradigm
of this paper, preemption’s three political actors, the President or his
executive agencies operate as a single entity and with a single voice, operating
under the direction of the person of the President. It is critical to note that in
this analysis paradigm, the actions of the federal Executive may or may not
be in concert with the Will of Congress, as expressed in either resolution or
law. Further, the federal Executive may hypothetically go so far as to have
chosen, within this three-way paradigm, to ignore most or all of the
enforcement actions that comprise the Will of Congress.
Therefore, the two federal actors may be in opposition to each other,
yet both also in separate opposition to the needs of the state. For example, in
this border security case study, the state of Texas has expressed a requirement
to secure an unprotected portion of the international border.75 In the absence
of federal resources to accomplish that task, the State (as represented by the
Texas Governor) has expressed a clear desire to act to fill the gap.76 The
resulting state action of sending non-federalized National Guard troops to the
border conflicts with the Will of Congress, as expressed in the complete body
of international border security law.77 That Will traditionally anticipates that
the federal government, embodied in the Department of Homeland Security,
shall fully occupy this field, to the exclusion of any Texas action.78 If the
executive agents in this scenario, both President and the Department of
Homeland Security, take no substantial action to fulfill the Will of Congress
in this field, then the Executive appears in conflict with both state needs and
the congressional objective. Thus, the traditional expectations of state,
congressional and executive interaction in a preempted field sets up a threeway conflict.
B. Traditional state expectations of federal government action are rooted
74
Id. (first citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); and then quoting Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
75
See TEX. DEP’T. OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 47.
76
Letter from Governor Perry, supra note 39.
77
See Leber, supra note 54.
78
See generally id.
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deeply in the demands of the Constitution.
The Supremacy Clause forms the basis for a federal requirement for
action. “The fundamental principle of supremacy of law, the crux of our
constitutional government, requires that all public officials obey the mandates
of the Constitution and the lawful enactments of the Congress.”80 The form
of government of the United States is in practice a dual citizenship model.
Under the Tenth Amendment, “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”81 Within the Constitution, a conflict resolution
of priorities is well established: “Article VI of the Constitution provides that
the laws of the United States ‘shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary
notwithstanding.’”82 In evaluating the impact of the Tenth Amendment on the
Supremacy Clause, the Supreme Court observed in a case involving the
Economic Stabilization Act of 1970: “[This Amendment] is not without
significance. [It] expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress
may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs States’ integrity or their
ability to function effectively in a federal system.”83 The impact of this
allowance that Congress, or in a more generalized sense, the federal
government, may not act to impair a state’s integrity has clear bearing on the
instant issues. The question to answer is whether federal inaction that impairs
a state’s integrity will therefore allow a state to constitutionally act in a field
preempted area.
79

The Fourteenth Amendment extends the privileges of constitutional
rights to the citizens of the states:84
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.85
The operative element of the Fourteenth Amendment is the notation of
citizenship of both the United States and the individual state. While the
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
C.B.S. Imports Corp. v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 724, 728 (Cust. Ct. 1978).
81
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
82
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2)
(demonstrating the traditional preemption analysis).
83
See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975).
84
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
85
Id.
79
80
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Fourteenth Amendment serves to extend rights of the U.S. Constitution to the
states, it recognizes the citizenship of the individual in a distinct state that has
corresponding responsibilities to its citizens.86
Of course, this responsibility of individual states to their
corresponding citizenry is tempered by the Supremacy Clause.87 “This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”88
In this regard, it is clear that in conflict between state and federal interests, the
Supremacy Clause sets the stage for a pre-eminent federal position over the
states.89 While not universal, the presumption that the co-equal federal actors
will operate in concert in fundamental areas of government as a single
supreme federal entity is inherent in the Supremacy Clause, as superior to the
state actor.90 But the status of the states vis-à-vis the federal sovereign is not
necessarily that of an inferior.91 “We begin with the axiom that, under our
federal system, the States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the
Federal Government, subject only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy
Clause.”92 Thus, the Supremacy Clause and the parent document suggest that
the states have obligations and rights, accompanied by sovereignty that is
comparable to the federal government.93 But the corresponding expectation
must be that those obligations of the federal government to the states in areas
where the federal government is supreme, by expression of law or
implication, will be met by activity commensurate with the state sovereign’s
needs.
The Tenth Amendment is limited by the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Supremacy Clause.94 The Tenth Amendment states that: “The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”95 The Tenth
Amendment serves to protect the police powers of the state from unwanted
intrusions by the federal government beyond those powers enumerated or

Id. (acknowledging that citizens are citizens of both the United States and their own state).
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (defining the subordination of the states to the supremacy of the
federal government in certain areas of law).
88
Id.
89
JOHNNY H. KILLIAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL75-500, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 961 (2004).
90
See generally id. at 974 (explaining the applicability of the Supremacy Clause to federal Executive
agencies created by Congress “to discharge the duties for the performance of which they were created [by
federal legislation]”).
91
See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (discussing the co-equal presumption of state and
federal sovereignty in Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion).
92
Id.
93
See id.
94
See generally KILLIAN ET AL., supra note 89, at 967 (describing the evolved power of the federal
government to more broadly overcome state law after League of Cities).
95
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
86
87
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allowed by the Fourteenth Amendment.96 “The purpose of the doctrine of
Tenth Amendment immunity articulated in National League of Cities . . . is
to protect the States from federal intrusions that might threaten their ‘separate
and independent existence.’”97 There are two areas of note within the context
of the Supreme Court’s language. Principally, the phrase “separate and
independent existence” is used in the context of National League of Cities and
EEOC to secure the rights of states within the context of labor in National
League of Cities v. Usery98 and age-based discriminatory action in EEOC v.
Wyoming.99 The motivation of “separate and independent existence”100 is a
general one, and applicable in a larger context to the insurance of the integrity
of the state in its most basic physical circumstances as well, to include the
integrity of its physical border. The second item to note within the language
of the Court is the concept of protection of federal intrusion that serves to
threaten a state’s integrity.101 This Comment distinguishes federal action that
is impactive on a state from the concept of federal inaction that is impactive
on a state. Ultimately, this forms the root of the argument that a state’s right
to “separate and independent existence” is assured by protection from both
federal action, as well as federal inaction.
C. Preemption characteristics: Congress has been the preeminent voice of
federal preemption status.
In principle, the Will of Congress has represented the federal interest
in countering states intrusions into preemptive areas, express or implied.102
This concept of congressional representation of the superior federal position
in the supremacy argument can be traced to the very beginnings of
constitutional conflict between federal and state law.103 In Gibbons v. Ogden,
that congressional role is expressed clearly as the sole actor in the analysis:
[I]t has been contended, that if a law passed by a State, in the
exercise of its acknowledged sovereignty, comes into
conflict with a law passed by Congress in pursuance of the
constitution, they affect the subject, and each other, like equal
opposing powers.

See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
Id. (discussing the Tenth Amendment’s effect to ensure states the right to a separate and independent
existence).
98
See generally 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
99
See generally 460 U.S. at 226 (discussing the method to secure the rights of states within the context
of age-based discriminatory action).
100
Nat’l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845.
101
See KILLIAN ET AL., supra note 89, at 1615 (explaining the balance of state and federal police
powers).
102
See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 60–64 (1941); see also Arizona v. United States, 132
S. Ct. 2492, 2514 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
103
See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
96
97
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But the framers of our constitution foresaw this state of
things, and provided for it, by declaring the supremacy not
only of itself, but of the laws made in pursuance of it.104
Thus, the framers and the early Supreme Court saw in Ogden the opportunity
to express the supremacy of federal law when in conflict with state law.105
This concept of supremacy as defined by the Will or actions of Congress has
been the fundamental concept of the construction of the two-actor preemption
tug of war.
1. Historically, preemption is funneled into two categories.
These are express preemption and implied preemption. Under the
Supremacy Clause, “State action may be foreclosed by express language in a
congressional enactment, by implication from the depth and breadth of a
congressional scheme that occupies the legislative field, or by implication
because of a conflict with a congressional enactment . . . .”106 The distinction
is found in the clarity of congressional intent. “Express” in Black’s Law
Dictionary is defined as “[c]learly and unmistakably communicated; stated
with directness and clarity.”107 Express preemption is then language declared
in legislation that clearly provides that the federal government will exert sole
authority and action in the area of the subject. Conversely, implied
preemption generally is the alternative, in which the intent of Congress is
found not in words, but in the purpose and extent of the legislation.
2. Within implied preemption, and in traditional analysis, preemption is
further subdivided into field preemption, conflict preemption, and obstacle
preemption.
“When considering preemption, ‘we start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” State law is
preempted only when Congress expressly intended to
preempt state law, when the federal regulatory scheme is so
pervasive that it demonstrates Congress’s intent to occupy
the field, or when state law “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.”108
Thus, the Supreme Court lays out the parameters of preemption in the various
Id. at 210 (emphasis added).
See KILLIAN ET AL., supra note 89, at 960.
106
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001) (internal citations omitted).
107
Express, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
108
John P. Dwyer, The Role of State Law in an Era of Federal Preemption: Lessons from
Environmental Regulation, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 209, 215–16 n.72 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
104
105
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categorizations, as one would expect. A view of preemption of a lower court
opinion, however, becomes highly instructive, as it encompasses precedent
doctrine and an impression of the subject as merged by multiple sources,
including Supreme Court language.109 A case in point––a lower court’s view
of the four major preemption categories, as laid out by the District Court of
the District of South Dakota in a railway case involving the Burlington
Northern and Santa Fe railroad.110
Preemption traditionally comes in four “flavors” . . . :
(1) “express preemption,” resulting from an express
Congressional directive ousting state law; (2) “implied
preemption,” resulting from an inference that Congress
intended to oust state law in order to achieve its objective; (3)
“conflict preemption,” resulting from the operation of the
Supremacy Clause when federal and state law actually
conflict, even when Congress says nothing about it; and (4)
“field preemption,” resulting from a determination that
Congress intended to remove an entire area from state
regulatory authority.111
This analysis model of the four preemption buckets by the court in Burlington
is highly instructive. The court delineates the various traditional aspects of
preemption doctrine, as historically and precedentially interpreted by the
Supreme Court.112 The lower court here begins with express preemption as
the clear expression of congressional directive or expressive Will.113 The
discussion of implied preemption is again framed in congressional intent or
Will.114 Conflict Preemption is similarly framed from state and federal law
conflict, without congressional language.115 Field preemption is likewise
based on congressional intent to exclude an area from a state authority. The
unifying element in the lower court’s analysis is Congress.116 All preemption
analysis in Burlington is through the lens of congressional Will or intent.117
As a general observation and rule, the body of preemption interpretation is
evaluated against the bounds of congressional expression of its Will or intent.
109

2003).

See generally South Dakota v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., 280 F. Supp. 2d 919, 927 (D.S.D.

110
Id. For an excellent discussion of preemption doctrine and categorization, see William Hochul III,
Note, Enforcement in Kind: Reexamining the Preemption Doctrine in Arizona v. United States, 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2225, 2227–31 (2013).
111
Burlington, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 927 (internal citations omitted).
112
Id. (first citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992); then citing Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); then citing Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
143 (1963); and then citing Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (defining
the four categories of preemption analysis).
113
Id. (citing Morales, 504 U.S. at 374).
114
Id. (citing Hines, 312 U.S. at 67).
115
Id. (citing Paul, 373 U.S. at 143).
116
Id. (citing Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 458 U.S. at 153).
117
See id. at 926.
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Indeed, recall in Arizona v. United States, that Justice Scalia reflects on the
Will of Congress118 in arguing immigration and security aspects of Arizona’s
state law.
3. Field Preemption presents the stressing case for analysis.
“In the absence of an express congressional command, state law is
pre-empted if that law actually conflicts with federal law, or if federal law so
thoroughly occupies a legislative field ‘as to make reasonable the inference
that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.’”119 Thus, field
preempted law is that category of state law that is held invalid because
Congress has implied, through a massive body of regulation, that it intended
to fully occupy the field, to the exclusion of any state law.120 “Field
preemption may exist where a federal regulatory scheme touches an area ‘in
which the federal interest is so dominant’ that it may be assumed that
Congress intended, or purposed, to preclude state action in that area.” 121
Within a field that has been preempted by an immense regulatory scheme,
there is no room for state law or action.122 Federal law and action fully
occupies the field in question, and it operates to the exclusion of the state.
The state is constitutionally unable to regulate or act in that field, either in
contradiction to the federal law in the field, or in support of the federal law in
the field.123 Dean and distinguished professor of law, Erwin Chemerinsky,
cites the classic case Hines v. Davidowitz as compatible state law that is
nonetheless subject to preemption in his work on constitutional law.124 In
Hines v. Davidowitz, the Supreme Court held that although a state
immigration law complemented federal law, Congress left no room for other
law, and therefore, Congress had implied that state immigration law was still
preempted by the massive body of federal law within the field.125
The nature of field preemption and its relationship to the state makes
this the stressing constitutional case in the three-actor paradigm. Without
room for either contradictory or complementary law at the state level, the
realization must follow that Congress will be the sole actor in the field.
Without the ability to support federal efforts mandated by Congress in law, a
state is therefore totally reliant on the Will of Congress and the actions of the
federal government to exercise the purpose and activities necessary for the
See 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2512 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (internal citation omitted) (first citing Fid.
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 458 U.S. at 153; and then quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947)).
120
Hochul III, supra note 110, at 2230.
121
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (discussing how the all-encompassing
manner of a federal regulatory scheme will supersede state law).
122
See Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 458 U.S. at 153.
123
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 446–47 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 4th
ed. 2013).
124
See id. at 447.
125
Id.
118
119
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implementation of the law. There is no room for state support; the state is, by
the Supreme Court’s precedent in Hines, totally reliant by implication of Will
of Congress and by interpretation of that pervasive Will or intent by the
judiciary. In any other type of preemption analysis, the scheme of federal law
may only extend as either expressed, or as in conflict or obstacle preemption
allows.126 In those categories, the field may not be totally excluded; state law
may exist within the field to the extent that it does not impact or conflict with
the stated federal body of law or regulation.127 However, in field preemption,
the result is completely distinct. The Will of Congress is so encompassing as
to fully occupy an entire field, effectively and fully excluding all other state
action.128
4. There is a resulting expectation that the federal Executive agent will act
in a field preempted area.
This is assertable because of the complete elimination of any state
power within a field-preempted area. There are two observations that give
rise to this assertion. First, the area or field is important, both to the federal
government and to the state. This is by definition. If the field was
unimportant, Congress would not have defined an entire body of law in order
to govern the field to its exclusive jurisdiction. The effort and content of a
massive body of law in a field suggests that the Will of Congress is implied
in important constitutional contexts. An observer can conclude that there is
no area so important in the view of Congress that it is field-preempted by
massive law, yet expressly unimportant at the same time. They are mutually
exclusive conditions. At the same time, a field that is so important to
Congress that it exerts massive law, must carry similar importance to any
state. In this context, an important issue to the state must be served. In the
traditional analysis, there are only two servicing political entities capable of
operating in the field: the state and the federal government.129 If the state is
precluded from operating at all in a field, by the preemptive Will of Congress,
then it must expect and indeed rely on the federal government to enforce its
law within the field to the mutual good of both the state and the federal
government. The assumption of the state must logically be that the federal
Executive agent, as the actor responsive to the federal Will of Congress, acts
to execute the enacted law in the field. There is no other constitutionallyenabled actor.130 To do otherwise would leave a Void of action in a full body
of law.
There is a similar imperative defined in the concept of null
126
127
128
129
130

See generally id. at 432–55 (discussing basic concepts of preemption doctrine).
Id.
Id. at 447.
See supra text accompanying note 1.
See supra text accompanying note 1.
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preemption by Professor Nash.131 In the case of null preemption, generally, a
Void exists in the federal regulatory scheme, but the states are nonetheless
preempted from action through various implied or expressed wishes of
Congress.132 For example, Professor Nash highlights “New York State’s
airline passenger ‘bill of rights’ . . . .”133 In this case, there were numerous
episodes of aircraft stuck on taxiways at major New York airports for hours,
while passengers suffered without necessities, followed by an attempt by the
state of New York to provide legislative limitations on airlines operating on
New York airports, in order to prevent significant passenger discomfort. 134
Professor Nash cites Air Transport Association of America, Inc. v. Cuomo, in
which the Second Circuit held that the New York law was expressly
preempted by the pervasive Federal Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.135 Of
note is not the express preemption itself, but Professor Nash’s observation
that although the U.S. Department of Transportation had considered such a
passenger Bill of Rights, it had not done so, and therefore, a null space or
Void existed in the area of passenger rights.136 In this case, the Void of federal
action and regulation existed in preempted space as expressed in the
Deregulation Act.137 This is similar to field preemption and failure to act, but
differentiable in structure and implication.
5. Null Preemption and failure to act.
Professor Nash defines null preemption in two steps.138 It is the
coexistent “preemption of state law and the choice of a ‘zero level’ of federal
regulation.”139 These two elements give substance to the null preemption
concept. The first is the existence of a preemption of state law.140 This is
typically enabled through express preemption.141 In Professor Nash’s model,
null preemption requires an affirmative preemptive action against the
presence of state law.142 The second dimension is the regulatory Void.143
Critically, Professor Nash explains that: “Null preemption’s regulatory Void
can be dissipated only when either the federal government dissolves its
affirmative preemption of state law and the state government regulates, or the
federal government itself chooses to regulate.”144
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144

See Nash, supra note 15, at 1016–21.
Id. at 1021.
Id. at 1032.
Id.
Id. (citing 520 F.3d 218, 221 (2d Cir. 2008)).
Id. at 1032–33.
Id. at 1032.
Id. at 1033–34.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1034.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
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The concept of null preemption can be generalized to the absence of
federal regulation in a preempted field, thus precluding state regulation as
well. “On one hand, field preemption seems to provide an example of null
preemption achieved through implicit preemption: It knocks out state laws
within the entire field, even those that are not directly covered by the
governing federal regulation.”145 However, there is a clear distinction
between null preemption and the instant topic of field preemption coupled
with federal inaction that becomes immediately obvious. Null preemption
depends on a regulatory Void in a preempted area of law.146 This Comment’s
focus is on field preemption coupled with federal inaction, the very concept
of field preemption becomes necessarily distinct from null preemption and
makes it non-inclusive in Nash’s theory. By its very definition, field
preemption is an entire field of law that is preempted precisely because
Congress has created a massive body of law to control the field.147 Contrast
this situation to null preemption where there is a regulatory Void in the
preempted area. “The very existence of field preemption turns on there being
substantial federal regulation of the field.”148 Null preemption’s field is then
not defined by massive regulation signaling congressional intent, but by a
regulatory Void in an area where there is expressed intent to preempt.
Professor Nash describes the subtle and not so subtle difference: “Viewed
more globally, therefore, the preemption is accomplished via the imposition
of massive federal regulation, which can hardly be described as the absence
of a federal standard.”149
Field preemption coupled with federal inaction is thereby
distinguished from Professor Nash’s model of null preemption, although there
is similar cause: the federal actor. In Nash’s null preemption, the conflict is
brought on by a lack of regulation, resulting in a Void that the states are
preempted from filling.150 Nash introduces the concept of two potential actors
causing that regulatory Void at the federal level, Congress or the federal
Executive.151 Both the concept of null preemption and field preemption
coupled with federal inaction carry the concept of potentially dueling federal
actors into the corresponding models. In his null preemption model, Nash
acknowledges the potential coexistence of substantial congressional law in a
field, coupled with a Void of federal regulatory guidance.152 For the purposes
of this Comment, discussing the instant concept of field preemption coupled
Id. at 1042.
Id. at 1034.
147
Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); see also Nash, supra note
15, at 1041 (discussing two types of implicit preemption).
148
Nash, supra note 15, at 1042.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 1039.
151
Id. at 1036–37 (describing and categorizing a complete theoretical framework for four “types” of
actor agent/effect in null preemption theory).
152
Id. at 1038.
145
146
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with federal inaction, that Void is not based on lack of regulation, but is based
on lack of activity and is solely confined to the federal Executive agent. In
this paradigm, Congress has expressed its Will thoroughly through a massive,
comprehensive body of law. Federal agency regulation is not lacking.
However, federal agency action to implement the Will of Congress is missing.
6. The federal Executive creates the conflict.
In this concept, the tug of war between states and the Will of Congress
exists, as it always has. It has been delineated throughout constitutional
preemption debate as dependent on the struggle between the state and the
ever-present Will of Congress.153 However, Professor Nash’s addition of the
federal Executive actor to the traditional dual preemption antagonists presents
a more refined model and an added dimension.154 In building on his model,
in the concept of field preemption and an activity Void, the federal Executive
actor adds to the strain, but in a distinct area of preemption, and in a distinct
manner from the null preemption model.155 The inaction is applied to field
preemption, and the federal inactivity is not in regulatory action, but in
enforcement action.156 In this new model of field preemption, the body of law
is sufficient, but the recalcitrant federal Executive agent/actor fails to carry
out the Will of Congress, for a variety of reasons.157 In the example of Arizona
v. United States, the effect of federal inaction in spite of massive bodies of
law in the field of immigration has cause severe impact.158
[I]n the last decade federal enforcement efforts have focused
primarily on areas in California and Texas, leaving Arizona’s
border to suffer from comparative neglect. The result has
been the funneling of an increasing tide of illegal border
crossings into Arizona. Indeed, over the decade, over a third
of the Nation’s illegal border crossings occurred in
Arizona.159
In an analogous manner to the immigration effect, the inaction of the federal
Executive actor to secure the border has caused a corresponding security

153
See supra text accompanying note 1; see, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 59 (1941); see
also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2514 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
154
Nash, supra note 15, at 1036.
155
Compare id. at 1037–38 (describing the federal Executive’s lack of existing regulations), with
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2520–21 (demonstrating the federal Executive’s lack of enforcement of existing
regulations).
156
See supra text accompanying note 155.
157
Rationale to not enforce may include, but is not limited to, budgetary, political, or discretionary
considerations.
158
132 S. Ct. at 2520–21.
159
Id. (describing the impact of the federal failure to enforce immigration law in the Arizona border
area).
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threat to the state of Arizona.160 The Will of Congress is expressed that the
border be secure, and that the federal Executive be the sole actor to secure the
national border.161 The field is established; Congress has expressed a Will to
be the sole actor in that field.162 The state is powerless to contradict or
complement the federal agent in fulfilling the wishes of Congress.163 But
contrary to the state’s needs and the Will of Congress, the federal Executive
agent has substantially failed to act to secure Arizona’s border.164 This
illuminates the federal Executive’s emerging role in the preemption tug of
war.
D. Preemption characteristics: The federal Executive is the corresponding
agent of preemptive activity, but has broad discretion in law.
In this three-way struggle, the federal Executive forms the second
element of the federal level. In traditional analysis, this executive actor and
the congressional actor work in concert to form the federal entity, competing
with the state in the preemption argument.165 In consideration of the
background of modern congressional–Executive relationships, this concerted
action representation may not be accurate. The federal Executive may (and
does) act in opposition to both state and congressional entities, for its own
political purposes.166
1. The federal Executive has promised to enforce the laws.
The marked and distinct division between the congressional and the
Executive branches is illuminated by the Supreme Court in the landmark
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer decision, marking the conflict in a
federal takeover of the strategic steel industry during the Korean War.167
In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power
to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea
that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his
functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of
laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad.168

160
Id.; cf. TEX. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 47 (describing the security deficiencies resulting
from the unsecured border in Texas, as well as Arizona).
161
See generally Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498 (acknowledging Congress as the sole field occupant).
162
Id. at 2502.
163
Id. at 2501; see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62–63 (1941).
164
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2521 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165
See supra text accompanying note 1.
166
See, e.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2521 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(demonstrating the federal Executive acting contrary to the Will of Congress by not substantially enforcing
elements of federal immigration law in Arizona, and acting coincidently contrary to the desires of the state,
as manifest by the Governor’s will).
167
See generally 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
168
Id. at 587.
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The President does not make or abrogate law; the President executes law.169
The obligations of the President to faithfully execute the laws are explicitly
expressed in Article II of the Constitution.170 “[H]e shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed . . . .”171 This means that the President or his
executive agencies will execute the laws that have been passed by Congress,
and enacted through Executive signature or a valid override of a veto.172 The
constitutional functionality of the President is clearly in regulatory and
departmental action, implementing the law, and not in the making of law. 173
“Under our constitutional scheme, Congress’s role is to enact laws. The
President’s role, in turn, is to execute those laws; he cannot make up the law
on his own.”174 There is a broad expectation that the federal Executive will
indeed enforce the laws and take responsive action in accordance with those
laws.175 This enforcement of law and federal action is complex on its face
and requires the concerted action of the entire executive branch to execute the
law. Certainly, events of the 21st Century have not made the task simpler or
less dynamic. So to meet these ever-present challenges, the President, as the
federal Executive, is authorized to enact the law.176 It is not an easy job, and
the political power of the Presidency reflects that observation. “By the
constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain
important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own
discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character and
to his own conscience.”177 This implies that the President must use skill and
judgment in directing how, and in what manner, lawful authority can be
brought to bear in the interests of the nation.178 Indeed, the entire federal
Executive branch faces the complexity of a dangerous world, and needs to
perform its duties in a responsive and well-considered manner. This is the
normative expectation of the federal Executive.179
While the congressional scheme dictates that the President
must execute the laws that Congress enacts, it does not
require that this function be performed robotically. On the
contrary, the very separation of legislative and executive
functions implies that enforcing the laws may be a matter of
judgment, a task of applying general laws appropriately Id.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
Id.
172
See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
173
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587; see also Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive
Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 697 (2014).
174
Price, supra note 173, at 689.
175
See, e.g., Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587.
176
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
177
Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 590 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
178
Id.
179
See generally Youngstown, 343 U.S. 582–85 (noting that the expectation of a federal Executive is
to perform in a responsive and well-considered manner).
169
170
171
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“faithfully” - in particular factual circumstances.180
This flexibility in action is embodied in the concept of Executive
Discretion.181
2. Executive discretion allows the federal Executive wide freedom to
operate in a dynamic and dangerous world.
This is not a new concept. The President is and must always be
responsive to the needs of the nation in challenging times.182 In the
Youngstown decision, the Supreme Court examined the flexibility of
Presidential power to meet perceived threats to the United States’ ability to
defend itself during the Korean War.183 In the President’s attempt to
nationalize steel production facilities, in order to avert a strike and ensure
uninterrupted flow of steel to the war effort, the Court noted that discretionary
action by the President is authorized to a limit––that limit being the violation
of Separation of Powers.184 As the Court expressed:
The Executive is authorized to exert the power of the United
States when he finds this necessary for the protection of the
agencies, the instrumentalities, or the property of the
Government. This does not mean an authority to disregard
the wishes of Congress on the subject, when that subject lies
within its control and when those wishes have been
expressed, and it certainly does not involve the slightest
semblance of a power to legislate, much less to ‘suspend’
legislation already passed by Congress.185
It is in the last clause of the last sentence, that the concept of an overreaching
Executive Discretion appears. The Court admonishes the federal Executive
that it does not have the power in discretion to suspend legislation already
passed, and enacted into law.186 In other words, the President is obliged not
only to actively enforce law, but is further obliged not to ignore law already
enacted.187 This suggests strongly that law is to be enforced by the federal
Executive, and that there is no room for un-favored law to be non-enforced.
But there can be practical bounds observed in that reality.
Price, supra note 173, at 696–97.
Id.
182
See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing the relationship between
presidential power and the assent of Congress, in this case acting in the absence of congressional consent
due to “imperatives of events”).
183
See id. at 582–84 (majority opinion).
184
See id. at 587–89.
185
Id. at 691 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (referencing and quoting the brief of the
Solicitor General of the United States in an earlier oil case, United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S.
459 (1915)).
186
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 691.
187
Price, supra note 173, at 689; see also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 691 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
180
181
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3. The limits of discretion are pushed by the Executive and reinforced by
the Judiciary.
Professor Zachary Price188 describes discretion operationally.
“Enforcement discretion––the authority to turn a blind eye to legal violations–
–is central to the operation of both the federal criminal justice system and the
administrative state.”189 In this sense, the Executive must be allowed the
opportunity to manage to exert some dominion over his or her branch of
government in order to deal with a variety of situations: budget restrictions,
limited manpower, and potentially ambiguous law are just a few examples.
The constitutional structure allows this discretion to exist.190 “This executive
task of applying law to fact necessarily entails some degree of judgment.
Unless the division of legislative and executive functions is pure formalism,
the establishment of an executive branch independent from the legislature
must signify a measure of discretionary executive control over
enforcement.”191 Thus, the President may not be strictly bound by a mandate
to enforce all certain law in a field.192 There appears to be some lesser-defined
extent where discretionary enforcement is acceptable.
The federal Executive clearly and certainly exercises this
discretionary enforcement, usually manifested as a conscious disregard of
enforcement activity, leaving a Void. Professor Price cites President George
W. Bush’s administration as having pursued this disregard of a field of law
through a policy of “deregulation through nonenforcement.”193 The
Presidential inaction in non-enforcement of the laws is not unique to that
administration.194
Under President Obama, the executive branch announced
policies of . . . delaying for substantial periods the
enforcement of key provisions of the Affordable Care Act
(“ACA”) . . . . The Administration also claimed statutory
authority to waive key requirements of federal welfare laws,
the ACA, and the No Child Left Behind Act.195
In response, the courts appear to have consistently attempted to pull
back the concept of discretion.196 In doing so, a more definitive view of non188
For an outstanding review of the history and implications of Executive Discretion, see Price, supra
note 173.
189
Id. at 673.
190
See id. at 697.
191
Id.
192
See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588–89 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
193
Price, supra note 173, at 674.
194
Id. (comparing the Administrative actions of both President Bush and President Obama in applying
presidential discretion).
195
Id. at 673–74 (citing Department of Health and Human Services and Department of Education
actions that demonstrate the administration’s intent to waive provisions of the respective acts).
196
See, e.g., In re Aiken Cty., 725 F.3d 255, 257 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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enforcement of the law has appeared.
[T]he President must abide by statutory prohibitions unless
the President has a constitutional objection to the prohibition.
If the President has a constitutional objection to a statutory
mandate or prohibition, the President may decline to follow
the law unless and until a final Court order dictates otherwise.
But the President may not decline to follow a statutory
mandate or prohibition simply because of policy
objections.197
Thus, the boundaries are now more strictly drawn by the judiciary, in order to
reign in an overbroad, discretionary power within the federal Executive.198
This is not just recent, but can be traced to earlier opinions of the courts,
finding their basis in long-standing Supreme Court precedent from 1838,
describing the conflict between congressional intent and failure of duty of the
Postmaster to pay for services obtained.199 “To contend that the obligation
imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power
to forbid their execution, is a novel construction of the Constitution, and
entirely inadmissible.”200 Therefore, in summary, there can occur a clear
conflict between the federal government’s obligation to enforce the laws, the
needs of the states, and the reality of an absence of federal action to fill the
obligation in a field where no one else can act constitutionally. Herein lies
the conflict.
E. Executive discretionary inaction meets preemption in the Will of
Congress.
Two forces come together in a clash of constitutional direction. On
one side of the balance of power equation sits Congress, which has expressed
its Will to act through appropriately enacted legislation. On the other side of
the equation sits the federal Executive, with the discretion to act in varying
degrees to enforce or enable the legislation enacted by Congress. In the
middle, the states presume that those forces are in balance and accord, as the
states are the ultimate benefactors of law and federal action. Yet those powers
may be unbalanced. Congress may express its Will through a massive body
of enacted federal law, the ultimate effect of which is to preempt state law and
197
Id. at 259 (explaining the court’s perception of the gravity of the implications of discretion by the
President). “This case raises significant questions about the scope of the Executive’s authority to disregard
federal statutes. The case arises out of a longstanding dispute about nuclear waste storage at Yucca
Mountain in Nevada.” Id. at 257.
198
Id.
199
See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (citing Kendall v.
United States, 37 U.S. 524, 612 (1838)).
200
Id. (citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s contrary view of early Presidential examples of discretion as
opined in Kendall).
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action within that field. Coincident to that expression of the Will of Congress,
and its effect in closure of the field to the states, the federal Executive may
choose to not respect the Will of Congress by not enforcing the law or by not
taking positive action in accord with the law. Left in a Void, the states are
unable to act, because the field is closed out, as defined by the earlier Will of
Congress. In the 21st Century scenario, the power and control seem to be in
the federal Executive’s corner through its wide discretion to act, without a
suitable check. Here discretion meets preemption, and the state has lost.
1. Rationale and causes for discretionary inaction are typically within
normal boundaries.
The impetus for reduced executive action to support a law are not
unanticipated. There may be a multitude of reasons that exist in a dynamic,
politically-charged world for modifying federal actions under law. One such
political theory is put forward by Professor Price:
[S]tructural forces may well explain why recent Presidents
have so frequently resorted to nonenforcement rather than
seeking a change in law. In an era of partisan polarization and
legislative gridlock, Presidents often cannot count on
Congress to develop legislative solutions to perceived
problems, or even to negotiate over such solutions in good
faith.201
Other motivations are equally valid, and in many instances, are compelling to
a federal Executive seeking to implement highly complex law.202 Professor
Price noted the recent implementation of the ACA by the administration of
President Obama as a case in point.203 In Professor Price’s example, the law
required insurance plans to comply with newly implemented mandates
contained in the law.204 As a “transitional policy,”205 the Department of
Health and Human Services declined to enforce compliance with the
insurance policy mandates, and suspended civil penalties for noncompliance.206 Professor Price assessed the motivation of the Executive to
operational and political factors.207 This is due to both implementation of an
immensely complex law, as well as political realities of reducing initial cost
shock to a constituency.208 Each motivation for discretionary implementation
Price, supra note 173, at 686–87 (emphasis added).
See generally id. at 749–54.
203
See generally id.
204
Id. at 750 (describing the circumstances of non-enforcement of the insurance plan compliancy
provisions of the Affordable Care Act).
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
See generally id.
208
See id. (describing the motivations of the President and departments in implementation of the
Affordable Care Act).
201
202
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of the ACA is predictable, and may not be unreasonable in context. But where
is the line between acceptable discretion and a conscious, unacceptable Void?
A principal example is present in environmental law. There is a significant
implication “at stake when federal inaction is alleged to preempt state law:
the battle over the authority of the states to regulate activities that contribute
to global climate change in light of the federal government’s largely sluggish
response to the environmental and health risks posed by climate change.” 209
An even broader example is the cornerstone issue in preemption:
immigration.210 In this region of preemption law, the focus remains squarely
on Arizona v. United States.211 This case is the immigration tee up to the
border security field hypothetical, and it is instructive to analyze the focus on
discretion in Arizona pre-trial arguments. In its brief on certiorari to the
Supreme Court, the United States explained that: “The INA establishes the
grounds on which an alien may be ordered removed. It also gives the
Executive Branch discretion to grant various forms of relief from removal, up
to and including permanent cancellation of removal and adjustment to lawfulpermanent-resident status.”212
Political, humanitarian, and economic
rationale are all given as potential reasons for employing this extremely openended regulatory allowance for discretion. Thus, for a state like Texas that is
on the front line of immigration issues that require expenditure of state
resources in reaction to federal immigration enforcement, the ability of the
federal Executive to have such a wide discretion that includes permanent
cancellation of removal is absolutely significant in creating a Void, and is
potentially highly impactive to state resources.213
2. State compensation mechanisms may be unsatisfactory.
In seeking to counter the Void caused by a preempted inability to act
on behalf of its own state interests, and a federal Executive that is nonassertive in fulfilling the Will of Congress, the state may have few choices to
act. This is certainly consistent with state experiences in the immigration
field.214 One of the few compensatory actions possible is the passage of law
for either effect or impact.215 Clearly state law in a field-preempted area is a
highly suspected candidate for preemption, but the very passage of law does
send a powerful signal, and that is exactly what has happened.216 Within our
209
Glicksman, supra note 17, at 8–9 (discussing the implications on climate change efforts due to
federal inaction in a regulatory scheme).
210
See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2494 (2012).
211
See, e.g., Hochul III, supra note 110, at 2226.
212
Brief for the United States at 3, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (emphasis added)
(internal citations omitted) (delineating the rationale of the United States Government for exercising
discretion in enforcement of immigration laws in Arizona).
213
See Fernandez, supra note 50 (discussing the fiscal impact of federal non-enforcement of border
responsibilities on the Texas budget).
214
See Jodré, supra note 24, at 553.
215
Id.
216
Id. (showing 222 immigration laws enacted in forty-eight states in 2009 due to federal inaction).
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hypothetical border security field, there are even fewer opportunities to act.
This is an area where inaction of the federal Executive is nearly
uncompensatable by the state.217 The actions of the Texas Governor to move
National Guard troops to the border areas can, in function, only partially
compensate for Border Patrol with its law enforcement abilities.218
This trend is increasing.219
Despite historic federal dominance in the sphere of
immigration, states recently began enacting statutes that
regulate the lives of immigrants with increasing frequency.
These statutes, defended by state governments as public
safety ordinances - matters of traditional state police power have created the present conflict between historic state police
powers and the federal government’s dominance in the field
of immigration.220
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr has provided a historical basis for states
preservation of police power rights against a potentially overbearing federal
government.221 “[T]he historic police powers of States were not to be
superseded by Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.”222 But this presumption of the preservation of a state’s police
power has eroded.223 According to Professor Chemerinsky’s assessment in
2004 of this supportive theory of residual state power, “recent Supreme Court
preemption cases clearly put the presumption in favor of preemption.”224
The current direction of the courts to preempt state law in recognition
of the Will of Congress is the principle argument in question. The answer
remains uncertain even in the forcing function case of immigration. “With
state governments delving into the ostensibly federal domain of immigration,
federal courts must ascertain whether such state legislation passes
constitutional muster, or if such laws impinge upon federal authority. The
Courts of Appeals have arrived at divergent answers.”225
This is pure preemption analysis. But the courts are increasingly
asked to adjudicate a second question: Given that the Will of Congress is
expressed over state interests, but the federal Executive thwarts that Will by
inaction, is there still presumptive field preemption? Professor Nash speaks
See, e.g., Letter from Governor Perry, supra note 39.
See id.
219
See Hochul III, supra note 110, at 2231–32.
220
Id.
221
518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
222
Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
223
Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (2004).
224
Id. (describing a shifting of presumption away from favoring the states to one of federal
presumption).
225
Jodré, supra note 24, at 553.
217
218
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of this conflict between Void and states’ rights in the context of Null
Preemption.226 Notably, his words are on point when extended to the instant
topic of Field Preemption coupled with Executive inaction. “The regulatory
voids resulting from such instances of ‘null preemption’ are rarely
normatively justified. Even if states lack a normative justification for
regulating, still the structure of the federal system means that null preemption
offends states’ sovereign prerogative to protect their citizens.”227 The
judiciary can be decisive on this point, but has apparently not staked a firm
position.
3. The judiciary reaction to preemption coupled with inaction is on record
but not powerful.
The Supreme Court has outlined the tug in this states’ power
preemptive analysis in rather clear language from Wyeth v. Levine.228 This
position appears particularly strong in evaluating the police power of a state
that perceives risk to citizens in either an immigration or border security
scenario. But the track record of high court review of these preemption issues
is inconsistent and is not powerful, nor clear, in recent Court precedent.229 An
analysis of the judiciary’s enforcement of preemption versus discretion must
focus on the Supreme Court’s view of preemption in a field that is critical to
state interests.
Two cases are identified by Professor Lauren Gilbert in
SCOTUSblog as indicative of uncertainty in the basic concept of preemption,
even before turning to a discretionary void left by the federal Executive.230 In
Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, several businesses,
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and civil rights groups challenged a law that
allowed suspension and revocation of business licenses if the business was
found to have employed illegal immigrants.231 The Court upheld the law,
stating that it was not preempted, in part because the licensing of businesses
was a part of immigration law that was allowed to the states by Congress, and
therefore outside the area Congress intended to regulate.232 In that way, the
law was not impliedly-preempted for either conflict or field preemption.233 It
See Nash, supra note 15, at 1015.
Id.
228
555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (first citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); and then
quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) (observing that: “[I]n all pre-emption
cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has ‘legislated . . . in a field which the States have
traditionally occupied,’ . . . we ‘start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress’”).
229
See Lauren Gilbert, Presuming Preemption: Implications of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting,
SCOTUSBLOG (July 15, 2011, 9:31 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/07/presuming-preemption-im
plications-of-mchamber-of-commerce-v-whiting/.
230
Id.
231
131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
232
Id. at 1987.
233
See id.
226
227
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is instructive to note the limits of analysis the Roberts Court restricted itself
to in deciding the case. “Implied preemption analysis does not justify a
‘freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with
federal objectives’; such an endeavor ‘would undercut the principle that it is
Congress rather than the courts that pre-empts state law.”’234
Contrasting in Lozano v. City of Hazleton, Lozano and other
individuals sued the city of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, arguing against certain
ordinances, where the federal Executive had not acted, that prohibited
employment and rental of dwellings to illegal immigrants, making it unlawful
to recruit, hire, or employ unlawful workers in Hazleton.235 The Third Circuit
found both field and conflict preemption applicable in overturning a portion
of the law, as immigration housing policy and law was “within the exclusive
domain of the federal government.”236 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and remanded back to the Third Circuit.237 The distinctions in the Supreme
Court’s treatment of the cases, within a short period of time, is not clear.238 In
Whiting, outside of explicitly finding an express preemption, the Court
intentionally moved away from an examination of implied preemption.239 Yet
in Hazelton, the Court seemed to be telling the Circuit to relook at its
preemption analysis and not to presume preemption, whether implied
preemption or conflict preemption.240 Professor Gilbert strikes at the issue
succinctly:
The Court’s decisions in Whiting and Hazleton underscore
the tension in preemption doctrine between cases where the
Court has emphasized the presumption against preemption
where Congress regulates in an area of “traditional state
concern” and those where the Court has declined to apply the
presumption on the basis that Congress has created a
comprehensive regulatory regime. Both Whiting and
Hazleton involved laws regulating immigrants in the field of
employment in a sphere where Congress has acted and thus
underscore the conflict between these two lines of cases.241
The Supreme Court has not been consistent or clear on the
preemption analysis.242 This idea is stated by William Hochul III: “For the
Court’s preemption analysis, it is important to first establish whether these
234
Id. at 1985 (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992) (Kennedy,
J., concurring)).
235
620 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, City of Hazleton v. Lozano, 563 U.S. 1030 (2011).
236
Id. at 224.
237
Lozano, 563 U.S. 1030.
238
See Gilbert, supra note 229.
239
Id. (evaluating the narrowness Whiting decision).
240
See id.
241
Id.
242
See generally Price, supra note 173, at 682–85.
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state statutes qualify as traditional exercises of state power, thereby creating
a presumption that Congress does not intend to preempt the statutes.”243 But
practicality and solutions to states’ issues may be weighing on appellate
courts’ views. The Third Circuit in Hazleton discusses this policy gap.244
“The dispute we are now called upon to address is one of an increasing
number of cases that have arisen from actions that state and local governments
have taken because of illegal immigration.”245 The catalyst issues of
immigration law clearly dictate future preemptive uncertainty in any
analytical case of border security.246 Then, the next layer of precedential
uncertainty to be added is the additional dynamic of significant, purposeful
inaction by the federal Executive.
4. Presidential discretion may exist in extreme: Nullification.
The shifting of power by the Executive in order to create action or
void in a policy area can be enabled through the concept of discretion. As
discussed supra, the concept of discretion is precedentially accorded a degree
of acceptance.247 But Executive Discretion is an expanding phenomenon, as
Professor Price indicates a rise in the modern instances of discretion of the
federal Executive.248
“Federal officials have even adopted public
nonenforcement policies in some circumstances; notable recent examples
include the Obama Administration’s stated policies of immigration
nonenforcement and suspension of the employer health insurance
mandate.”249 Yet, the Void of inaction itself does not automatically suggest
that there is a gap that must be filled. The Supreme Court has found even
inaction gaps to show and support federal preemption and therefore barring
state compensatory enforcement actions.250 In a notable example, the Court
found in Isla Petroleum: “Where a comprehensive federal scheme
intentionally leaves a portion of the regulated field without controls, then the
pre-emptive inference can be drawn — not from federal inaction alone, but
from inaction joined with action.”251 Thus, a Void of action in a preemptive
field may not immediately draw a requirement or even a constitutionallyacceptable reaction from a state. However, when discretion becomes
extreme, the complexity may change the state’s reaction.
Hochul III, supra note 110, at 2232.
See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 175 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, City of Hazleton v.
Lozano, 563 U.S. 1030 (2011).
245
Id.
246
See, e.g., id.; see also Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1987 (2011)
(discussing the inability of states to implement licensing sanctions). But see Arizona v. United States, 132
S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (explaining state law must give way to federal law given an express preemption
provision).
247
See Price, supra note 173, at 673–75.
248
Id. at 742.
249
Id.
250
See, e.g., P.R. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495 (1988).
251
Id. at 503.
243
244
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Discretion beyond the judiciary’s accepted precedent becomes
significantly problematic. Returning to National Treasury Employees Union,
“[t]he Supreme Court, in rejecting that contention [that the President can
refrain from executing law], observed that its logical extension would give
the President authority effectively to nullify Acts of Congress.”252 Thus, a
President, “acting” to not enforce a significant portion of law can effectively
nullify law.253 The baseline case is found in Dames and Moore v. Regan.254
President Reagan terminated claims against Iran, following the Hostage
Crisis.255 In that case, Dames and Moore argued that the Executive did not
have the power to nullify law and remove their claim against the Iranian
government.256 The Supreme Court held that Congress authorized the
nullification of certain Iranian claims, post-hostage crisis, and the
discretionary nullification actions of the federal Executive survived review.257
The Court evaluated the case against the highest standard of presidential
power, in the presence of congressional express approval.258 But, what if the
federal Executive nullifies significant law in a field where there is no
congressional approval, acquiescence, or even acknowledgement? In fact, the
original border security hypothetical suggests that there is significant
congressional (and state) disfavor with a policy of presidential inaction. What
standard then?
The Supreme Court in Dames and Moore even forecast this
eventuality in describing the narrowness of its decision in that case.259 “We
are thus clearly not confronted with a situation in which Congress has in some
way resisted the exercise of Presidential authority.”260 In the case of Dames
and Moore, the President acted with not just congressional acquiescence, but
with some explicit congressional approval.261 However, that alternative
situation has now arisen. In the border security field, and its triggering
immigration field, the federal Executive acts against the approval of the
current Congress.262 The enacted law is silent, and the only standard present
to force Executive action is the “Well and Faithful Clause” of the
252
Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (evaluating the meaning
of the President’s duties under the Well and Faithful Clause). The Court described that duty limitation,
indicating “[t]hat constitutional duty does not permit the President to refrain from executing laws duly
enacted by the Congress as those laws are construed by the judiciary.” Id.
253
See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981).
254
Id.
255
Id. at 655.
256
Id.
257
See id. at 687–88 (highlighting the potential for the “President’s loose discretion”).
258
Id.
259
Id.
260
Id. at 688.
261
See id. at 687–88 (discussing Congress’ general acquiescence to the President’s actions and the
Senate committee’s actual approval of establishment of a Tribunal).
262
See Robert Costa, Congressional Republicans Consider Using Short-Term Funding Bill to Pressure
Obama, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/congressional-republicans
-consider-using-short-term-funding-bill-to-pressure-obama/2014/11/14/4d1cde3e-6c3b-11e4-a31c77759fc1eacc_story.html.
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Constitution. The standard for this scenario is against the President: “[W]hen
the President acts in contravention of the will of Congress, ‘his power is at its
lowest ebb,’ and the Court can sustain his actions ‘only by disabling the
Congress from acting upon the subject.’”263 Congress surely has indicated
that it does not want to be disabled from the debate regarding the field of
immigration and border security. “Congressional Republicans said . . . that
they might create a series of showdowns over funding the government to try
to force President Obama to back down on his expected plans to overhaul the
nation’s immigration system.”264
Discretion in the extreme, when in a preempted field, yields a
powerfully daunting constitutional issue. The significant inaction of the
federal government produces a Void where there is, by definition,
considerable incentive by a targeted state to act.265 This is not nullification
alone. This is nullification within a preempted field. The concept creates such
a significant gap that a state must respond in compensation but is
constitutionally unable by the definition of the field. The issue is untried, and
as demonstrated supra, the courts appear hesitant to engage. Professor Price
sums up the context of the issue: “[A]lthough enforcement discretion is a valid
executive authority, one with deep historical and normative roots in our
constitutional tradition, it is subject to important limits - limits that the
executive branch must recognize, even if courts are unlikely to enforce
them.”266
5. The border security hypothetical becomes constitutionally plausible.
In returning to the case study in border security, Congress has enacted
a full series of law to ensure the borders are secure.267 That is a task to be
taken on fully by the federal government.268 However, the federal Executive
has chosen through “discretion in extreme” to not enforce the law in the
interrelated field-exempted areas of immigration and border security. The
hypothetical is potentially fulfilled in a recent presidential initiative to nullify
certain immigration and deportation laws. A Texas state representative
summarizes the reality of the hypothetical-turned-case study:
Republican Texas state Sen. Charles Schwertner [says] he
believes the states will be more fiscally burdened because
Obama’s executive actions would encourage more illegal
immigrants to enter the U.S. in the long run. He said Texas
263
Dames, 453 U.S. at 669 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38
(1952)).
264
Costa, supra note 262.
265
See supra text accompanying note 1 (discussing the operational standard of “significant federal
inaction”).
266
Price, supra note 173, at 688.
267
See OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, supra note 52.
268
Id.

Published by eCommons, 2016

196

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1

will continue to resist offering new services to unauthorized
immigrants, “protected” or not.
“I guess it will put a strain on our medical system, our social
safety networks,” he told FoxNews.com. “It encourages
further lawlessness, and it is unfair to those seeking to
immigrate legally.”
“Texas is going to take the stand it needs to – we’re going to
protect our citizens.”269
So, by definition of the immigration and border fields, Congress has
signaled in no uncertain terms through massive law that the state has no
appropriate role.270 Ideally, the actions of the federal Executive match up
precisely with the Will of Congress. This relationship between the President
and Congress is depicted in Figure 1.

269
Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Obama’s Immigration Overhaul Could Put Burden on States, FOX NEWS
(Nov. 15, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/11/15/obamas-immigration-overhaul-could-putburden-on-states/.
270
See generally Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152–53 (1982) (describing
the characteristics and implications of field preemption).
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Figure 1: The Ideal: Execution matches the Will of Congress
But in a more pragmatic world, the federal Executive, through
discretionary power, has chosen to not enforce significant aspects of that law.
In this real world, the federal Executive does not fully execute the entirety of
the “Field of the Will of Congress,” even to the point of effective nullification
of a portion of the field law. The field that results, then, is made up of three
components that vary with time. They are: (1) the Intentional Execution of
the federal Executive; (2) the constitutionally-acceptable, discretionary
inaction of the federal Executive; and (3) the remaining portion of the field
that is consciously non-enforced, or effectively nullified––the Void. This
relationship is depicted in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: The Will of Congress Spans Discretion and the Void
In Figure 2 (and in an ideal world), the federal Executive’s “Well and
Faithful Execution” of law should fully encompass and match up with the
Field of the Will of Congress. This Field that Congress promises it will fully
occupy is most adequately filled by the intentional execution of the federal
Executive. Then, ideally, “Well and Faithful Execution” of the law is
achieved by the federal Executive implementing the entirety of the actions
and laws required of the Field. However, the courts have allowed, and the
President applies, a level of acceptable discretion that suggests all the laws of
the Field are not fully enforced. In other words, there exists an acceptable
gap accounting for the dynamic and discretionary issues that any president
faces in implementing complex law. But there is also the potential that a gap
grows so significantly that it is beyond acceptable discretion, and leaves a
significant enough Void in the Field that is unacceptable to the state, runs
counter to an unfulfilled Will of Congress, and effectively nullifies existing
law. It falls short of the goal of the “Well and Faithful Execution” standard.
In Figure 2, that absence of action, beyond acceptable discretion, is labeled as
the Void.
Professor Price describes the Void accurately, and outlines the
criticality of this situation in his commentary on the federal Executive’s
selective non-enforcement of varied aspects of the ACA (insurance):
This exercise of enforcement discretion extends far beyond
the case-specific enforcement discretion that may be
presumed with respect to any particular statutory
requirement. It amounts, rather, to a prospective suspension
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of the law for a specified category of insurance plans –
precisely the form of executive nonenforcement that is
presumptively impermissible.271
This then leaves the state in a security conundrum, with its sovereign state
government accountable to its population for security, but without a federal
agent to act. The state is left with no available recourse to fill the Void, and
no way to constitutionally compensate with its own police powers. This
situation is depicted in Figure 2. If the federal Executive can, in Professor
Price’s word, impermissibly exert such a discretionary power in extreme,
nullify the law, and leave a significant Void that upsets the balance, can this
be checked and remedied constitutionally?
The challenge is two-fold. First, how is “significance” in the Void
defined in order to trigger a remedy? Then, once a significant Void is indeed
identified, what constitutional remedy is available to resolve the issue on
behalf of the state?
IV. RESOLUTION
A. Confluence of three forces yields a power struggle with limited checks.
The confluence of three powerful interests in a field of critical interest
creates tension operationally and constitutionally. Congress A, at some time
in the past, has expressed its Will in a body of law that the federal Executive
should exert sole power in an area, in this case, border security. The state,
which has an international border subject to Congress A’s Will, relies on the
federal Executive to exert that power and regulation in the border security
field. Federal Executive A does so, to the satisfaction of every actor involved.
At some time in the future, things change. For political, budgetary or
policy reasons, the new federal Executive B orders a halt in execution of some
laws in the field of border security. The state experiences non-enforcement
of federal law within its territory and sees a rise in budgetary issues and
security breaches due to the lack of border enforcement. Due to the
constitutional nature of field preemption, the judiciary will not allow state law
and state enforcement to make up the Void.272 Through an exercise of
discretion, this deliberate failure is at odds with the intent and Will of past
Congress A, which may or may not be synchronous with the Will of current
Congress B. The issue of resolution faces a sturdy obstacle of the Separation

271
Price, supra note 173, at 751 (describing impermissible Executive enforcement inaction in not
enforcing various provisions of the Affordable Care Act’s insurance mandate, and by analogy, depicting a
Void similar to that created by impermissible Executive enforcement inaction in the example Border
Security field).
272
South Dakota v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 919, 927 (D.S.D. 2003)
(describing the characteristics of field preemption).
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of Powers.
1. Congressional Will must be expressed, or more accurately, re-expressed.
The Will of Congress is the catalyst for any preemptive action.273 The
Will of Congress to preempt law in an entire field has been traditionally
manifest by the massive volume of law in that field. Given a previous time
A, actors and budget, the Will of Congress was clearly that the federal
Executive operate completely and uniquely in the field, in this case border
security. However, at a current time B, the actors, budget, and situation have
changed. At some level of federal Executive activity, the Will of Congress
that the federal Executive be the sole actor in the field may have changed. To
what effect is the Will of Congress B able to override the Will of Congress A?
The issue is an extension of the conceptual impact of legislative
silence on judicial interpretation. “Ultimately, the most significant problem
facing the silent acquiescence argument is its inconsistency with the Court’s
own theory of statutory interpretation, that ‘[i]t is the intent of the Congress
that enacted’ the statute in question ‘that controls.’”274 As the Supreme Court
has moved in stare decisis cases to consider inaction of Congress as
acquiescence to a federal Executive’s interpretation of law, then the Court
moves effectively to take into account a Will of Congress B over the initial
Will of Congress A on the point in question.275 While Lawrence C. Marshall
argued for a super stare decisis that will force congressional engagement
when necessary to alter interpretative history,276 the concept is closer to a reexpressive Will, instead of mere silence.
Guido Calabresi, in A Common Law for the Age of Statutes, put such
a revised legislative Will in context.277 “When a court says to a legislature:
‘You (or your predecessor) meant X,’ it almost invites the legislature to
answer: ‘We did not.’”278 Given an appropriately expressive format, Congress
B can successfully express its Will over Congress A. This is consistent with
Food and Drug Administration v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
where in spite of initial congressional intent in the original language of the
statutory authorization of the FDA, the FDA failed to enforce regulatory
action in cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products, creating a long-lasting
Void, and then argued it was not responsible for regulating tobacco
273
See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2514 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 60–67 (1941) (describing the Will of
Congress).
274
Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory State
Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 193 (1989).
275
See id.
276
See id. (advancing the concept of super stare decisis in judicial interpretation); see also Maria Crist,
Lectures on Legislative Interpretation at the University of Dayton School of Law (2014).
277
See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 31–32 (Harv. Univ. Press
1982).
278
Id.
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products.279 In attempting to exert later control in their own, self-created
Void, the FDA was precluded from authority by later Congress, based on
subsequent congressional action during the time the FDA renounced
authority.280 It therefore appears sufficient in precedent that Congress B can
exert a positive degree of Will over the initial Will of Congress A. In the
instant case study, the Will of Congress A that the federal Executive fully
occupy the field may be alterable through an expression of the current
Congress B. But what should this revised Will seek to effect?
2. The Separation of Powers means limited power to force the federal
Executive to act.
Congress can exert a firm Will. Indeed, in our border security
scenario, Congress A has expressed a clear intent, through its massive law,
that the federal Executive should execute exclusive enforcement and action.
Yet the federal Executive has ignored the Will of Congress A, in discretion
and nullification. Presumably, a subsequent expression by Congress B of that
same “Will” will result in a similar unsatisfactory, discretionary reaction. At
the same time, Congress B cannot force the federal Executive to act beyond
its normal lawmaking and oversight functions.
Ordering specific
performance as a remedy in a services contractual breach is generally
regarded as ineffective at the least, and the likely equivalent of servitude. In
the same way, a Congress B, ordering the accomplishment of a specific
enforcement task, is either an ineffective government equivalent of directed
servitude of one branch or a distinct violation of Separation of Powers. The
concept does not work in contracts law, and is not appropriate for “social
contract” law either, especially if the federal Executive has indicated an
unwillingness to act. However, the entity that does have the most powerful
incentive to act in the three-way preemption struggle is the state.
3. The state has the Will and interest to act.
The state has the Will and the need to act in the Void.281 Indeed, in
the border security hypothetical, the state is attempting to act in lieu of federal
action.282 In the real case scenario, the Texas Governor has already dispatched
National Guard troops to the border in the absence of sufficient federal border
security assets in place.283 Professor Gilbert is on point, given this
hypothetical scenario and actual case study, in her comment: “If a state or
local law regulates immigration, field preemption principles may apply and
the law should be preempted unless the federal government has delegated
279
280
281
282
283

529 U.S. 120 (2000).
See id.
See e.g., Letter from Governor Perry, supra note 39; see also Jodré, supra note 24, at 553.
See Letter from Governor Perry, supra note 39.
See OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, supra note 52.
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power to the state to regulate.”284 This effectively places the state in the Void
left between the federal Executive’s actions, acceptable discretion, and the
span of the Will of Congress.285 As discussed supra, the state has a strong
incentive to fill both the Void and the space filled by acceptable discretion.286
The rationale for the state incentive to act to fill these spaces is founded in the
security mandate of the state government and for sustainment of its fiscal
operation.287 But there must be a trigger to enable state-level remedial action
in filling the Void.
B. The key to remedial action lies in two dimensions: Substantiality and
Will of the current Congress.
There are two dimensions to possible reconciliation of the strain of
the state against the preemptive Void. They lie in the size of the Void and the
Will of the current Congress.
1. Establishment of Substantiality: The size of the Void determines the
requirement to act.
So long as the Void remains small, the implications of conflict remain
correspondingly small. The issues of a non-enforcement Void created by
excessive Executive Discretion are manageable under a current balance of
powers. The Executive can potentially be held in check in routine
circumstances by either a state lawsuit and resulting court order, or through a
less formal congressional-Executive adversarial political relationship.288
These actions are the normal ebb and flow of power, and they do not signal a
constitutional preemption issue beyond the traditional tug.
If the Void in a field-preempted area becomes substantial, then the
situation changes significantly. In a large Void scenario, the Will of Congress
has been ignored by the Executive in a likewise substantial manner, causing
the state to feel enforcement, security or compensation deficiencies within the
field.289 In this case, the state is precluded by preemption from taking action
to directly remedy the Void, and is therefore put at risk. The question is one
of proper determination of substantiality of the Void. There is no direct
measure, nor a quantifiable means to establish a trigger. However, there is an
indirect measure of substantiality. If Congress B is willing to act to remedy
Gilbert, supra note 229.
See supra Figure 2.
286
See Fernandez, supra note 50.
287
See id.
288
See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52 (1941); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (demonstrating the typical court
action to restrain federal Executive Discretion, or to preempt state action, bringing the federal and state tug
of war into balance with the Will of Congress).
289
See, e.g., TEX. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, supra note 47 (describing the substantial issues facing the
state of Texas as a result of federal Executive inaction in enforcing law in the field of border security).
284
285
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the Void created by the inaction of federal Executive B, the Void is, by
definition, substantial. Thus, an action of Congress to reaffirm or restate its
Will in the field is its own mark of a substantial Void in the Executive’s
failure to execute its Will. Substantiality and Will merge in the desire of
Congress B to take action.
The action of Congress B to reassert its Will, in contrast to Congress
A’s original Will, is naturally a difficult one. The bar is high. In suggesting
that the Will of Congress B is clear and unambiguous in declaring its view on
current events and excesses, one may suppose that the Will reflects a uniform
view of the feelings of Congress. However, the clear nature of the body
suggests that Congress B’s re-expressed Will to act, marking a Void of
substantive size, is through a majority vote, and will never be unanimously
agreed upon. But the majority can indeed hold the power to re-express. While
not all representatives or senators may agree to the re-expressed Will, the key
is what margin represents a sufficiently re-expressed Will. To restate the
question: what majority level reflects appropriate substantiality?
In fairness, the margin, as an entering argument, must be the same as
was expressed in the original Will of Congress A. Thus, if the original Will
was expressed on a simple majority basis, so must the Will of Congress B to
re-exert. If the original Will was expressed on an overriding two-thirds
majority to enact, then Congress B must re-exert its Will on the same twothirds majority. In this way, Congress B cannot act to undo an action of
Congress A, at a lower consensus level than the original legislative action.
This establishes an imperative and hurdle that the Will of Congress A is not
modified easily by Congress B. Professor Jamelle C. Sharpe puts this
potential conflict between Congress A (enacting Congress) and Congress B
(sitting Congress) in perspective, and wisely warns of the Supreme Court’s
wariness to overturn an original Will of Congress lightly:290
Courts must choose whether to follow the directives of the
Congress that enacted the potentially preemptive statutory
language or the directives of the sitting Congress that has the
power to overrule its interpretation. . . . Courts that view their
role as protecting the legislative bargain reached by the
enacting Congress will likely be mindful of how the sitting
Congress will respond to their decisions-so as to further
minimize the possibility of legislative override . . . .291
2. Establishment of the Will of the Current Congress: A step to remedial
action.
Given substantiality of the Void, Congress expresses its Will for
290
291

See Jamelle C. Sharpe, Legislating Preemption, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 197–98 (2011).
Id.
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execution of action to fill the Void. In the case at hand, that Will of the
originating Congress A was impliedly expressed by the creation of a massive
body of law in the field. Left untouched, that massive body of law conveys
the same field preemptory message. In order to effect a re-expression of its
Will, either through a modification or a full reiteration, Congress must go
beyond an implied preemptive intent and clearly express its revised Will. This
is consistent with the voice of Justice Scalia in his Arizona dissent292 and
signals a solution path. In this way, the Will of Congress B can be evaluated
against the originating Will of Congress A, paving the way for resolution.
The critical partner in a re-expressive Will of Congress is the state.
In this question, Texas is the unrequited partner, and its unsecured border is
the Void. So long as the state has the police power and desire to remediate,
there is a way forward other than reliance on the federal Executive to selfcorrect.
C. Resolution to ensure constitutionality of state remedial actions.
While the Void remains, the states are stymied to act, even though
they might be willing partners with appropriate powers and resources. In
viewing the cause of the Void as less important than the options available to
fill that Void, there is some applicable academic literature to assist in
establishing a solution set. Recall that the field preemption Void is created
by a federal Executive embracing discretion to an extreme, effectively
nullifying a portion of law in the field.293 In Professor Nash’s model of null
preemption, a similar Void is created by an absence of regulation.294 When
viewed from this perspective, Professor Nash lays out the crucial imperative
for a solution set.295 “Null preemption’s regulatory void can be dissipated
only when either the federal government dissolves its affirmative preemption
of state law and the state government regulates, or the federal government
itself chooses to regulate.”296 Professor Nash’s implication is that the federal
government must act to fill the Void or affirmatively remove preemption as a
barrier to state action.297 Thus, the path to fill the Void is laid out in either
traditional congressional action or through a clear, re-expressive Will.
Congress can either legislatively allow state police powers or in the
alternative, re-express its Will to allow co-incident action by the states in a
generally field-preempted area. This generalized situation is depicted in
Figure 3, showing the reduced Will of Congress, and the addition of states’
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2514 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See supra Figure 2 (describing the relationship between the Will of Congress in Field Preemption
and the Void).
294
See Nash, supra note 15, at 1034.
295
See id.
296
See id. (describing how a Null Preemption Void is eliminated; while the Void creating mechanisms
are different in Null and Field preemption, this solution is appropriate to consider and potentially analogous
to the elimination of the Void in Field Preemption).
297
Id.
292
293

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol41/iss1/8

2016]

THREE-WAY SUPREMACY CLAUSE TUG OF WAR

205

action to compensate for the Void, bringing execution up to the full measure
required.

Figure 3: Reduced Field of the Will of Congress, supplemented by state
action.
The dominant question remaining within this study is how to
effectively open the Void to states to act in that space left open by the federal
Executive’s inaction. There are two apparent avenues to this end: express
legislative operation of Congress to open the Void or a broad re-statement of
the Will of Congress. We will examine each.
1. Congress statutorily allows state police powers authority to operate in
the Void.
This option is clearly the most direct and can be achieved in two
ways. The first, and simplest, requires Congress to specifically allow state
action in a limited role. The second, and broader option, requires Congress
to dismantle a portion of the field, thus eliminating the fixed boundaries of
field preemption, and opening the field to state action in the gaps created by
the Void.
a. Statutory language allowing state action.
Given a willing partner, this solution mode appears simplest.
Congress A had originally established the body of law so pervasive as to create
a field. In this case, Congress B sees a Void that exists in its desired
enforcement of the law in the field. Congress B can act to allow state action
to fill that Void. This congressional action has the effect of reducing the field,
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and supplementing it through allowance of state action in the congressionallyperceived Void. Historically, the concept of preemption was limited, and
supported states’ activities to complement the Will of Congress.298 Professor
Chemerinsky described the precedential nature of a similar, less absolutist
view of preemption, in deference to state activity.299 “[D]uring the first third
of this century, dual federalism was entirely about restricting the authority of
Congress by narrowly defining its powers under Article I and by reserving a
zone of activities to the states.”300 In doing so, Congress allows state activity
in a very narrow, defined area. Traditionally, the method of assenting to, or
even fully asserting, its desire to allow state action in a predominant area was
through funding incentivization.301 For example, in South Dakota v. Dole, the
federal government acted to entice South Dakota to raise the purchase age of
alcohol from nineteen to twenty-one by threatening to withhold highway
funds.302 South Dakota challenged the Secretary of Transportation’s ability
to entice state action, and that ability was upheld.303 The practice has more
generalized implications for expressing a federal or congressional Will.
“Incident to [the Spending Clause], Congress may attach conditions on the
receipt of federal funds[] . . . . Thus, objectives not thought to be within
Article I’s ‘enumerated legislative fields[]’ may nevertheless be attained
through the use of the spending power and the conditional grant of federal
funds.”304 Even reticent states can be, and have been, made to fill gaps created
by Congress.
[T]here are a variety of methods, short of outright coercion,
by which Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative
program consistent with federal interests. As relevant here,
Congress may, under its spending power, attach conditions
on the receipt of federal funds[] . . . . Moreover, where
Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under
the Commerce Clause, it may, as part of a program of
“cooperative federalism,” offer States the choice of
regulating that activity according to federal standards or
having state law pre-empted by federal regulation.305
Thus, Congress can invite and even urge states to fill in the Void of federal
Executive inaction in narrow areas through the use of its budgetary powers.

298
See id. (describing an earlier Twentieth Century notion of preemption, focused on restricting
Congressional power and reserving power to the states).
299
Chemerinsky, supra note 223, at 1328–29.
300
Id. at 1328.
301
See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (discussing the relationship in preemption
between the states and federal governments).
302
See generally id. at 203.
303
See id.
304
Id. at 206 (internal citation omitted).
305
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 145 (1992) (internal citations omitted).
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b. In the alternative, disassembly of the massive field of federal
law.
A second method of directly creating a state opportunity to act in the
Void left by federal Executive inaction, albeit in a still limited confine, is to
disassemble a portion of the federal law on point, allowing states to fill that
gap. The operational methodology of this path lies in Congress acting to
repeal limited aspects of federally-unenforced border security law that
constitutes the Void, with the understanding that willing states will fill in the
gap as required. The Will of Congress becomes explicitly exclusive of the
narrow area of law that Congress repeals. This sets a broader tone, however.
“Congress’s chosen level of deference to state interests will be reflected in the
language that Congress enacts, and there is no reason automatically to give
that language a narrowing construction.”306 In this way, the Will of Congress
that the sovereign states partner with the federal Executive in filling the Void
becomes much clearer than simply an explicit “repeal Federal and replace
with state” tactic. The language, as Professor Caleb Nelson points out, can
reflect a larger congressional Will that is broader in context.307 In this way,
the courts can potentially observe the larger congressional Will that supports
state interests and action. As the states then act in concert with the federal
Executive, their partnership ordained by the Will of Congress precludes a
presumption of field preemption. Professor Chemerinsky argues a similar
recommendation, limiting preemption to express preemption and clear
conflict between federal and state law.308 Thus, the courts can observe the
intent of Congress’ action to undo federal law, in deference to state action.
Robert Weiner expresses this view:
[S]o long as the Court draws the inferences and makes the
assumptions underlying field preemption in furtherance of
the statutory goals, and so long as the Court in fact treats the
purpose of Congress as the touchstone of its analysis, then
there should be no need to indulge a presumption against
preemption to show respect for state authority.309
Thus, Congress in this way can act to open action in a previously
foreclosed field through targeted, specific areas, either through explicit
statutory action, or statutory disassembly of a portion of the field, creating a
presumption against preemption. Either option opens the field in a limited
manner to an eager state, desiring to fill the Void constitutionally. But
statutory action requires federal Executive assent and signature. Given the
See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 302 (2000).
See id.
308
See Chemerinsky, supra note 223, at 1332.
309
Robert N. Weiner, The Height of Presumption: Preemption and the Role of Courts, 32 HAMLINE L.
REV. 727, 744 (2009).
306
307
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Void was created by federal Executive policy decisions, approval of statutory
mechanisms to resolve the Void is not a forgone conclusion. However, there
is a broader option that can be preferable in meeting the more generalized
needs of the states without resorting to statutory repeal, or federal Executive
concurrence.
2. Congress re-expresses its Will to affect desired preemption parameters.
Congress has an opportunity to express itself on a broad and
independent basis, vis-à-vis the federal Executive. It can potentially offer a
unilateral invitation to states to partner with federal government. Congress
can reassert its Will against the changing tide of the character of the issue and
against the potential unwillingness of the federal Executive to enforce that
Will. In his dissent in Arizona, Justice Scalia noted that in such conflict,
implicit preemption does not satisfy the needs of competing dual federal
systems.310 State power to act requires that “‘Congress . . . unequivocally
express[es] its intent to abrogate[]’ . . . . Implicit ‘field preemption’ will not
do.”311 Weiner supports this argument that implied preemption must be made
more explicit to adequately serve the parties.312 “The requirement of ‘a
specific statement of pre-emptive intent’ to demonstrate ‘an implicit intent’
to preempt in and of itself bespeaks some doctrinal disarray.”313 This is
asserted by Justice Scalia and Weiner against the typical application of
Congressional Preemptive Will: a positive statement that Congress desires to
act solely within those bounds expressed.314 That position makes field
preemption an implied doctrine and express preemption mutually exclusive.
There appears, however, a method of expression of Congress that
refines and reasserts the Will of Congress, yet is not mutually incompatible
with the cautions of Justice Scalia and Weiner and is within the definitions of
express and implied preemption. Whereas the typical express preemption is
a positive definition of Congress’ Will to act exclusively in an area, Congress
may similarly express a negative definition of its Will to remain non-exclusive
in a portion of that field. In other words, Congress B expresses its Will to
allow other agents to act within some defined bounds in a field originally
specified by Congress A.
Operationally, there is no conflict or disarray, as was projected by

310
See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2514 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
311
Id.
312
See Weiner, supra note 309, at 743.
313
Id.
314
See South Dakota v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 919, 927 (D.S.D. 2003)
(explaining the concept of express preemption and describing express versus implied preemption in
context).
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Justice Scalia or Weiner.315 For example, Congress A has enacted so broad
an array of legislation within the border security field, that there is an implied
preemption within that field, as demonstrated by its congressional Will. Yet,
intervening circumstances and changing federal Executive policies have
altered the enforcement within that field. Congress B observes that the
original Will of Congress A is not fulfilled. Yet, Congress B does not desire
to dissemble the statutes in the field, or potentially constrain subsequent
federal Executives at later points. Congress B “simply” desires to
constitutionally allow the assistance of state agents in a Void created by
current federal Executive inaction. As its check against an inactive,
discretionary, nullifying federal Executive, Congress B then expresses its Will
that it does not desire preemptive exclusivity within distinct areas of the field.
In this way, the implied preemptive nature and general bounds of the field
remain intact; in our case, border security law remains fully intact. However,
Congress B, in countering a non-enforcing federal Executive within an area
of the field, expresses its refined Will to both the states and the courts, that it
wishes state partnership within distinct portions of that field. This allows
supportive state action to fill the Void, in support of the state’s needs, despite
an inactive federal Executive. Thus, the re-expression of congressional Will
becomes an expressed exclusion to implied field preemption. The resulting
relationships are depicted in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Congress re-expresses its Will and opens the Void to state action.
315
Contra Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2514 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see Weiner,
supra note 309, at 743.
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3. Concurrent Resolution: the mechanism of solvency.
The mechanism of re-expression is through Concurrent Resolution of
Congress, by original majority requirements.316 The goal of Congress B is
expression of its Will to the courts, the federal Executive and the states. This
is not a statute, but an expression of congressional position, or Will.
Therefore, it does not follow the path of a bill, in the sense of presidential
signature requirements.317 Indeed, it is an expression of the Will of Congress
as a voice independent of the Executive. For example, Congress B expressly
resolves that it is its Will that the federal government shall not be the sole
actor in some limited area of border security. This opens the field in a clearly
delimited area for state action. The Resolution of Will does not demand
anything of the federal Executive. On the contrary, the resolution is silent on
that topic, and allows a continued federal Executive enforcement, or nonenforcement, of the law, potentially eliminating the legislative override
issue.318 However, as depicted in our case study, Congress B has now
unequivocally allowed, without constitutional preemption challenge, the
opportunity for the state, Texas for example, to partner with the federal
Executive in a manner consistent with the overall border security field and
within the general intent of the originating Congress A.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress expresses its original Will through legislation. If it creates
such a body of law in an area, the inference is that Congress has intended to
fully occupy the field to the exclusion of either contradictory or
complementary state law and enforcement. Yet Congress must leave
enforcement of the body of law in a field to the federal Executive. This
federal Executive may act in complete concert with the Will of Congress, or
may only enforce some subset of the body of law in the field. There is an
acceptable, discretionary option left to the federal Executive in enforcement
of the Will of Congress. To the extent that the federal Executive fails to
enforce the Will of Congress beyond the mere discretionary bounds, a Void is
created. The states are excluded by implied field preemption theory to act
within this Void. They must rely on the federal Executive to enforce within
the field but are helpless in constitutionally enforcing within the Void. In
pursuit of a policy of non-enforcement of federal law, the federal Executive
can create a Void that has the potential to endanger individual states. In doing
so, the paradigm of preemption has changed to a three-way struggle between
See discussion on “substantiality” supra Section IV.B.1.
Concurrent resolutions reflect the sense of both chambers and do not require a presidential signature.
318
Contra Sharpe, supra note 290, at 197–98 (warning of the courts’ wariness of legislative override
in supporting the Will of the sitting Congress (Congress B) in lieu of the enacting Congress (Congress A)).
316
317
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the Will of Congress, the action of the federal Executive, and the needs of the
state.
This struggle can be resolved constitutionally, within the boundaries
of field preemption through a re-expressive Will of the current Congress. In
this way, Congress can act as an independent checks and balance, not on
Executive action, but on Executive inaction. The requirement to act is based
on the substantial nature of the Void, measured by congressional desire and
ability to act. If the Void is substantial, Congress can act with a corresponding
majority, in concurrent resolution, to re-express its Will. If the Void is nonimpactive or insubstantial, Congress will not be able to muster sufficient
majority to re-express a Will. But in an expression of non-exclusive federal
space within a field, Congress can maintain the field preemption presumption,
alerting courts, the federal Executive, and states of its desire for state action
to supplement or supplant the federal Executive and maintain the full body of
law for future federal Executives. The state can then act with the firm
knowledge that it is acting within the Constitution and bounds set by
Congress.
The balance of power in such a free society is met by the ebb and
flow of policy and politics. The challenge is always to meet the current issues
of the day, and yet fully preserve the checks and balances to meet the needs,
rights, and responsibilities of future generations. This is critically true of the
balance between a federal Executive, Congress, the Courts, the states, and a
changing security environment. The re-expressive Will of Congress to
counter the presumption and failure of federal action in a field-preempted area
is but one way to maintain that balance for future generations.
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